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Abstract
Using Trusted Execution Environments for Secure Stream Processing
of Medical Data
by Carlos Segarra Gonza´lez
Processing sensitive data, specially medical data produced by body sensors, on third-party un-
trusted clouds is particularly challenging without compromising the privacy of the users generating
it. Typically, these sensors generate large quantities of continuous data in a streaming fashion.
Such vast amount of information must be processed efficiently and securely, even under strong
adversarial models. The recent introduction in the mass-market of consumer-grade processors
with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX, paves the way to implement
solutions that overcome less flexible approaches, such as those atop homomorphic encryption.
This Bachelor Thesis presents a secure streaming processing system built on top of Intel SGX.
To showcase the viability of this approach, we use it with a system specifically fitted for medical
data. We design and fully implement a prototype system that we evaluate with several realistic
datasets. Our experimental results show that our system introduces a reduced overhead to vanilla
Spark while offering strong additional protection guarantees under powerful attackers and threat
models.
Keywords: TEE, Trusted Hardware, Stream Processing, Intel SGX, Spark
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Resum
Using Trusted Execution Environments for Secure Stream Processing
of Medical Data
per Carlos Segarra Gonza´lez
El processat de dades de cara`cter personal, especialment aquelles provinents de dominis me`dics,
en servidors remots al nu´vol, e´s particularment delicat quan es vol preservar la privacitat dels
usuaris que les generen. Molt habitualment, aquestes dades provenen de petits sensors que l’usuari
du posats i que emeten un flux continu de mesures. Dit volum de mesures no nome´s han de ser
processades de manera eficient, sino´ tambe´ de manera segura, fins i tot contra hipote`tics atacants
amb acce´s privilegiat a les ma`quines al nu´vol. La recent introduccio´ al mercat de processadors
amb Entorns d’Execucio´ Segura (Trusted Execution Environments), com ara Intel SGX, faciliten
la implementacio´ de solucions me´s flexibles i lleugeres que les basades en esquemes de criptografia
homomo`rfica.
Aquest Treball de Final de Grau presenta una plataforma de processament segur de fluxos que
es basa en Intel SGX. Per il•lustrar la viabilitat de la plataforma, la usem en un entorn me`dic.
En el decurs del treball, dissenyem i implementem un sistema prototip que evaluem amb jocs de
dades reals. Els nostres resultats experimentals mostren que la plataforma introdueix un discret
ralentiment en comparacio´ amb la implementacio´ esta`ndard de Spark, tot oferint un nivell de
proteccio´ adicional per a les dades dels usuaris.
Paraules Clau: Entorns d’Execucio´ Segura, Computacio´ Segura, Processament de Fluxos,
Intel SGX, Spark
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3Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are more and more pervasive in our lives [3]. The number of
devices owned per user is anticipated to increase by 26× by 2020 [4]. These devices continuously
generate a large variety of data. Notable examples include location-based sensors (e.g., GPS),
inertial units (e.g., accelerometers, gyroscopes), weather stations, and, the focus of this paper,
wearable sensors that monitor human-health data (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate, stress).
Also referred as P4 medicine (Predictive, Preventive, Personalized, and Participatory), per-
sonalized health uses this continuous stream of human-health data to make more targeted and
effective diagnoses and treatments [5]. Medical decisions are based on the predicted response of
each particular user. To implement personalized health ecosystems, a fleet of devices monitoring
and processing each person’s vital signs is of crucial importance.
These devices usually have very restricted computing power and are typically very limited in
terms of storage capacity. Hence, this continuous processing of data must be off-loaded elsewhere,
in particular for storage and processing purposes. In doing so, one needs to take into account
potential privacy and security threats that stem inherently from the nature of the data being
generated and processed. Cloud environments represent the ideal environment to oﬄoad such
processing. They allow deployers to hand-off the maintenance of the required infrastructure, with
immediate benefit, for instance, in terms of scale-out with the workload.
Processing privacy-sensitive data on untrusted cloud platforms presents a number of challenges.
A malicious (compromised) Cloud operator could observe and leak data, if no countermeasures
are taken beforehand. While there are software solutions that allow to operate on encrypted data
(e.g., partial [6] or full-homomorphic [7] encryption), their current computational overhead makes
them impractical in real-life scenarios [8].
The recent introduction into the mass market of processors with embedded trusted execution
environments (TEEs), e.g., Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [9] (starting from proces-
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sors with codename Skylake) or ARM TrustZone [10], offer a viable alternative to pure-software
solutions. TEEs protect code and data against several types of attacks, including a malicious
underlying OS, software bugs, or threats from co-hosted applications. The application’s security
boundary becomes the CPU itself. The code is executed at near-native execution speeds inside en-
claves of limited memory capacity. All the major Infrastructure-as-a-Service providers (Google [11],
Amazon [12], IBM [13], Microsoft [14]) are nowadays offering nodes with SGX processors.
We focus on the specific use case of processing data streams generated by health-monitoring
wearable devices on untrusted clouds with available SGX nodes. Algorithms for analyzing car-
diovascular signals are getting more complex and computationally-intensive. Thus, traditional
signal-processing approaches [15] have now evolved to more advanced solutions like deep neural
networks [16, 17]. This increase in computational expenditure has moved the processing towards
centralized centers (i.e., the cloud) with bigger and more dynamic processing power. In this
work we present a system that computes in real time several metrics of the heart-rate variability
(HRV) streaming from wearable sensors. While existing stream processing solutions exist [18, 19],
they either lack support for SGX or, if they do support it, are tied to very specific programming
frameworks and prevent adoption in industrial settings.
1.2 Contributions
In this section we highlight the contributions the work here presented makes, and also the compo-
nents and resources we are given privileged access to.
The contributions of this thesis are twofold. First, we design and implement a system that
can process cardiac signals inside SGX enclaves in untrusted clouds. Our design leverages SGX-
Spark, a stream processing system that exploits SGX to execute stream analytics inside TEEs
(described in detail in §2). Note that our design is flexible enough to be used with different stream
processing systems (as further described later), and other input data streams. Second, we compare
our system against the vanilla, non-secure Spark. We perform an exhaustive assessment on the
introduced overhead, and we conclude that the introduced slow-down factor is reasonable even for
large datasets and high workloads. What leads us to conclude that the technology is almost ready
for production environments.
As introduced before, our design has SGX-Spark in its processing core. SGX-Spark is a
modification to Spark to run security sensitive code inside SGX (see §2.1). It is an on-going
project in the Large-Scale Data & Systems group from the Imperial College London [20]. We have
been given early-access to the code in order to use it in our platform and provide a performance
assessment.
5 1.3. Document Structure
1.3 Document Structure
The structure of the rest of this thesis is the following one. In Chapter 2 we introduce the
preliminaries required to follow the rest of the sections. We divide it in §2.1 where we introduce the
concepts that surround the design, implementation, and deployment of the system. And §2.2 where
we introduce and motivate the envisioned use-case, and contextualize the data streams we will feed
our streaming platform with. In Chapter 3 we cover the state of the art for privacy preserving
stream processing engines of medical data. In Chapter 4 we first describe our system’s architecture
(§4.1, §4.2) and then we go on to introduce our threat model (§4.3) and our system’s known
vulnerabilities (§4.4). Then, in Chapter 5, we describe how the previously introduced architecture
is implemented (§5.2, §5.1) and deployed (§5.3). A complete and exhaustive evaluation of the
system is then presented in Chapter 6. In particular, we first describe the evaluation context:
hardware settings (§6.1), experiment configuration (§6.2), analyzed metrics (§6.3), and injected
workloads (§6.4). To then present the obtained results in §6.5. Lastly, further research lines and
the thesis’ conclusions are presented in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively.
Chapter 1. Introduction 6
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Background
In this chapter we introduce general concepts to better understand the design and implementation
details of our system. Firstly, we introduce the hardware, software and programming frameworks
that we leverage, and then the medical technicalities regarding the data we use and the processing
we make of it. In §2.1, we cover technical aspects exploited in the remaining of this work, specifi-
cally: we describe the concept of Trusted Execution Environment, the operating principles of Intel
SGX and Spark, and lastly we present two key frameworks developed by the Large Scale Data &
Systems [20] group at the Imperial College London, SGX-LKL and SGX-Spark. In §2.2, we
describe the specificities of the data streams from the medical domain our system deals with, how
this data streams are obtained, together with the required processing that our system allows to
oﬄoad on an untrusted cloud provider, and how this processing can be useful in a real use case.
2.1 Technical Background
2.1.1 Trusted Execution Environments and Intel SGX
A trusted execution environment (TEE) is an isolated area of a main processor that provides
code and data therein contained with confidentiality and integrity guarantees [21]. Confidentiality
refers to preventing unauthorized parties from accessing sensitive information and integrity to
ensuring that sensitive code and data is not tampered with. An application developed to run
and be deployed in a TEE is called a Trusted Application (TA). Trusted Execution Environments
have already been available for several years in the main CPU vendors’ commodity CPUS. Arm
TrustZone has been part of Arm’s architecture since v6 for Cortex-A processors (2012) and v8
for Cortex-M (2018). Intel R© Software Guard Extensions (SGX) were introduced with the
sixth generation of Intel’s processors codename Skylake in 2015.
In comparison with Arm TrustZone, Intel SGX include a remote attestation protocol, sup-
port multiple trusted applications on the same CPU, its SDK is easier to program with, and there
is a greater variety of programming frameworks to develop SGX-based TAs. Most importantly, all
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the major Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers (Google [11], Amazon [12], IBM [13], Mi-
crosoft [14]) are nowadays offering nodes with SGX processors. For these reasons, Intel SGX is
our chosen hardware solution to deploy our platform in.
Untrusted Code
1
Create Enclave
2
Call Trusted
Function
7
3
Trusted Code
Call
Gate
4
Execute
5
Return
6
Figure 2.1: Intel SGX execution workflow.
Intel Software Guard eXtensions are a set of
new instructions and memory access changes
added to Intel’s architecture. These exten-
sions enable applications to create hardware-
protected containers in their address space, re-
ferred to as enclaves. An enclave provides con-
fidentiality and integrity even in the presence
of malicious privileged software such as virtual
machine monitors (VMM), BIOS, or operating
systems (OS) [22]. At initialization time, the
code and data is free for inspection and, once
loaded to the enclave, the latter is measured
(via hashing) and sealed. An application us-
ing an enclave identifies itself through a remote
attestation protocol and, once verified, inter-
acts with the protected region through a call
gate mechanism. The application can also ver-
ify that its secure code is running in a genuine enclave using the same attestation protocol via
platform specific keys.
Services using SGX divide its source code in an untrusted and a trusted part. The former
deployed outside the enclave and the latter inside. Figure 2.1 breaks down the typical execution
workflow of SGX services. After the initial attestation protocol, code in the untrusted region
creates an enclave and securely loads trusted code and data inside (Figure-Ê). Whenever this
untrusted code wants to make use of the enclave, it makes a call to a trusted function (Figure-Ì)
that gets captured by the call gate mechanism and, after performing sanity and integrity checks
(Í), gets executed (Î), the value returned (Ï) and the untrusted code can resume execution
(Ð). It is important to stress that the security perimeter is kept at the CPU package and, as a
consequence, all other software including privileged software or even other enclaves are prevented
from accessing code and data located inside the enclave. In particular, the systems’ main memory
is left untrusted and the traffic between CPU and DRAM over the protected address range is
managed by the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) [23].
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2.1.2 Spark and Spark Streaming
Apache Spark is a cluster-computing framework to develop scalable, fault-tolerant, distributed
applications. It builds on RDDs, resilient distributed datasets [22], a read-only collection dis-
tributed over a cluster that can be rebuilt if one partition is lost. It is implemented in Scala and
provides bindings for Python, Java, SQL and R. Spark Streaming [24] is an extension of
Spark’s core API that enables scalable, high-throughput, fault tolerant stream (mini-batch) pro-
cessing of data streams [25]. We leverage on Spark Streaming to perform file-based streaming, by
monitoring a filesystem interface outside the enclave and processing new files as they are loaded.
In particular, and as detailed later in Chapter 5, we use the Discretized Streams API [18].
2.1.3 SGX-LKL and SGX-Spark
Developed at the Large Scale Data & Systems Group (LSDS) [20] at the Imperial College London,
SGX-LKL [26] is a library OS to run unmodified Linux binaries inside enclaves. It provides sup-
port for complex applications and managed runtimes enabling in-enclave user-level threading, sig-
nal handling, and paging. Namely, it allows the execution of a full Java Virtual Machine (JVM) in-
side an enclave. This feature enables the deployment of Spark, and Spark Streaming applications to
leverage critical computing inside Intel SGX with minimal to no modifications to the application’s
code.
SHM
Spark
Worker
Worker
Enclave
Driver
&
App Entry
Point
Driver
Enclave
T1 · · ·TN
Spark Master
Figure 2.2: SGX-Spark attacker model and col-
laborative structure scheme.
SGX-Spark [27] builds on SGX-LKL. It par-
titions the code of Spark applications to execute
the sensitive parts inside SGX enclaves. Fig-
ure 2.2 depicts its architecture. The engine de-
ploys two collaborative Java Virtual Machines
(JVM), one outside (Figure 2.2, left) and one
inside the enclave (Figure 2.2, right) for the
driver, and two more for each worker deployed
in the cluster. Spark code outside the enclave
accesses only encrypted data. The communica-
tion between the JVMs is kept encrypted and
is performed through the host OS shared mem-
ory (SHM). SGX-Spark provides a compila-
tion toolchain, and it currently supports the
vast majority of the native Spark operators, al-
lowing to transparently deploy and run existing
Spark applications into SGX enclaves. This is,
the user must only compile the source code together with SGX-Spark’s and, as long as the op-
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erators used are supported by the framework, execution is seamlessly deployed inside the enclave
with no amendments to the vanilla Spark implementation.
2.2 Cardiac Analysis
The data streams used for the evaluation and the algorithms compiled with SGX-Spark belong
to the medical domain and motivate the real need for confidentiality and integrity. As further
explained in Chapter 4, our use case contemplates a scenario where multiple sensors track the
cardiac activity of different users. The two most standard procedures for monitoring heart activ-
ity are electrocardiograms (ECG) and photoplethysmograms (PPG). ECG-based systems measure
the heart’s electrical activity over time and is the chosen method by chest-based sensors [28].
PPG-based systems measure the variation of blood volume over time using LEDs and photodi-
odes. Although less precise, PPGs are the chosen technique by all wrist-based cardiac monitoring
sensors [29].
In both cases, ECG and PPG based, we contemplate the usage of wearable sensors. Wearable
technologies are electronic devices that are incorporated into items which can comfortably be worn
on the body [30]. Due to space and power constraints, these sensors’ memory, computing power,
and communication capabilities are limited. As a consequence, to be embedded in a functional
ecosystem, they rely on a gateway that forwards the information generated by the sensors to the
cloud. This environment is depicted in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Envisioned sensor ecosystem composed of: a user, a wearable device, a gateway with
internet connection, and the cloud were results are stored and processed.
The generation of the approximated diagram (ECG or PPG) and the time measures are done
inside the sensor. Figure 2.4 depicts a schematic representation of an ECG and the values streamed
from the sensor to the gateway: R peak’s timestamps and RR intervals.
In our case, we focus on the analysis of the Heart Rate Variability (HRV) [32], that is, the
analysis of the variation in the time intervals between heartbeats (a.k.a. RR intervals). The HRV
11 2.2. Cardiac Analysis
Time (s)
Amplitude (mV )
R0
P1
Q1
S1
T1
R1
R2
gateway://data/data file.csv
t(R1), t(R1) - t(R0)
t(R2), t(R2) - t(R1)
.
.
.
Figure 2.4: Schematic representation of an ECG signal showing three normal beats. A normal
electrocardiogram can be broken down in three waves: a P wave corresponding to the depolar-
ization of the atria, a QRS complex corresponding to the depolarization of the ventricles and a T
wave corresponding to the repolarization of the ventricle [31]. From an ECG the sensor extracts
and streams the R-peaks’ timestamp and the time elapsed between them.
is of utmost importance since it has been shown to be a predictor for myocardial infarction [33, 34].
With healthy individuals’ heart rate (HR) averaging between 60 to 180 beats per minute (bpm),
the average throughput per client is between 23 and 69 bytes per second. Finally, despite our
system being specifically designed for streams with these data features, its modular design (as we
later describe in Chapter 4) makes it easy to adapt to other use-cases.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
In this Chapter we cover the related work that sets the current State-of-the-Art for privacy pre-
serving stream processing engines of medical data. Together with each piece of work, we provide
a brief description and argue why it has or has not been considered for our project. In §3.1 we
cover the most notable big data stream processing engines that relate with our system. Note that
stream processing is a big field and it is out of the scope of this work to provide a detailed survey.
In §3.2 we introduce relevant privacy-preserving processing engines: both stream and batch based.
Lastly, in §3.3 we cover other approaches at cardiac data monitoring.
3.1 Stream Processing Engines
Stream processing has recently attracted a lot of attention from academia and industry [35, 36, 37].
Apache Spark [24] is arguably the de-facto standard in this domain, by combining batch and stream
processing with a unified API [25]. Apache Spark SQL [38] allows to process structured data by
integrating relational processing with Spark’s functional programming style. Structured stream-
ing [39] leverages Spark SQL and it compares favorably against the discretized counterpart [25] in
terms of performance. However, the former lacks security or privacy guarantees, and hence it was
not considered. Furthermore SGX-Spark only has support for the Discretized Streams API, and
therefore we also rely on it.
3.2 Privacy-Preserving Computation
Opaque [40] is a privacy-preserving distributed analytics system. It leverages Spark SQL and Intel
SGX enclaves to perform computations over encrypted Spark DataFrames. In encryption mode,
Opaque offers security guarantees similar to our system’s. However, (1) the Spark master must be
located in the client side, for it must be trusted. An scenario that does not fit in our multi-client
setting. And (2), it requires changes to the application code, and hence is not transparent to the
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user. In oblivious mode, i.e., protecting against traffic pattern analysis attacks, it can be up to
46× slower, a slow-down factor not tolerable for the real-time analytics in the scope of our system.
SecureStreams [19] is a reactive framework that exploits Intel SGX to define dataflow processing
by pipelining several independent components. In order to use this framework, the user requires a
good knowledge of the underlying implementation. Moreover, applications must be written in the
Lua programming language, hindering its applicability to legacy systems or third-party programs.
DPBSV [41] is a secure big data stream processing framework that focuses on securing data
transmission from the sensors or clients to the Data Stream Manager (DSM) or server. Its secu-
rity model requires a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and a dynamic prime number generation
technique to synchronously update the keys. In spite of using trusted hardware on the DSM end
for key generation and management, the server-side processes all the data in clear, making the
framework not suitable for our security model.
TaLoS [42] is a Transport Layer Security (TLS) [43] library that terminates connections by
maintaining sensitive information inside enclaves. The authors provide custom wrappers for the
most common TLS API calls and securely store users and sessions’ keys inside enclaves. The
embedding with a native Spark, or SGX-Spark, application is not transparent to the end user and
hence why we discard it.
Lastly, homomorphic encryption [44] does not rely on trusted execution environments and
offers the promise of providing privacy-preserving computations over encrypted data. This is, it
generates an encrypted result from two encrypted operands, corresponding to the encrypted value
of operating both operands in plain text. The key feature of the scheme is that, at no point, neither
the operands nor the result are processed in clear. While several works analyzed the feasibility of
homomorphic encryption schemes in cloud environments [45, 46], the performance of homomorphic
operations [47] is far from being pragmatic.
3.3 Cardiac Monitoring Systems
For the specific problem of HRV analysis, while periodic monitoring solutions exist [48], they are
focused on embedded systems. As such, since they off-load computation to third-party cloud
services, these solutions simply overlook the privacy concerns that we consider. Similarly, another
solution [17] uses convolutional networks for the detection of arrhythmias. However, the authors
take no considerations with regard to data security and privacy.
This work is one of the first attempts to building a privacy-preserving real-time streaming
system specifically designed for medical and cardiac data.
Our system fills the existing research gap by proposing a system that leverages Intel SGX
enclaves to compute such analytics over public untrusted clouds without changing the existing
Scala-based source code.
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Chapter 4
Architecture
The aim of this Chapter is to depict our system’s architecture. A high-level abstraction is presented
in Figure 4.1, where each different component is represented together with the path data follows.
We follow a client-server organization and each functionality is designed to be modular and self-
contained for the ease of deployment, evaluation, scalability and availability.
On general lines, the server-side component is executed on untrusted machines (for instance
nodes on the cloud) where Intel SGX is available. There, the SGX-Spark engine is deployed
and stream processes the data generated by an arbitrary number of clients using a set of medical
algorithms. Each client consists of a sensor and a gateway: the former generates samples in a
continuous fashion, and the latter aggregates them and periodically sends them to the cloud-based
component. Similarly, the gateway fetches the results every fixed time intervals. A filesystem
is mounted at the server-side to interface the interaction between the clients and the processing
engine. Each client data stream is processed in parallel independently of the chosen algorithm,
and results are also stored separately.
The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows: §4.1 details the server-side architecture,
§4.2 does the same with the client-side component, in §4.3 we cover the considered threat model
and the security assumptions we make in the design and lastly in §4.4 we present our project’s
known vulnerabilities.
4.1 Server-Side
The server-side component is made by three different modules: a filesystem interface, the SGX-
Spark engine, and a set of algorithms to analyze HRV. The filesystem interface acts as a landing
point for the batches of data generated by each client and also stores the algorithm results. This
way, the gateway can fetch with the desired frequency the processed information. Currently, the
filesystem is mounted and unmounted, respectively at start-up time and upon the shutdown of the
service. SGX-Spark monitors the directory and processes new data as it is loaded.
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Figure 4.1: (Left) Schematic of the system’s main architecture. A set of clients bidirectionally
stream data to a remote server. The interaction is done via a filesystem interface. On the server
side, SGX-Spark performs secure processing using different HRV analysis algorithms. (Right)
Breakdown of a packaged client: it includes a sensor and gateway that wrap four different mi-
croservices (mqtt broker, mqtt-subscriber, consumer, producer) to interact with the remote
end.
The streaming engine and the pool of algorithms are compiled together by the same toolchain,
yet they are independent. A Spark job deployed in standalone mode executes: the master process
for resource management and allocation (not included in Figure 4.1), a driver process that orches-
trates the execution, and an arbitrary number of worker processes executing tasks. In the case of
SGX-Spark jobs, two Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) are deployed per driver and worker process:
one inside an enclave and one outside. The communication between JVMs is kept encrypted and
is done through the host OS shared memory (see Figure 2.2). A process outside the enclave never
sees data in clear since sensitive operations are always executed in secured environments. Note
that, for each newly deployed worker, a new pair of JVMs and a new enclave are also deployed.
SGX-Spark requires that algorithms are compiled together with the engine so that code can
be loaded inside enclaves. However, the specific algorithm that we will execute is currently set at
start-up time. It is important to note that each client has its own dedicated data stream assigned,
hence being able to choose different algorithms. These will be executed concurrently, each yielding
separated results.
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4.2 Clients
The client is a combination of: a sensor that constantly generates data, and a gateway that
interacts with the remote end (see the right hand side (RHS) of Figure 4.1). For evaluation
purposes, the sensor component is replaced by a synthetic data generator that simulates samples.
As introduced in §2.2 and depicted in Figure 2.4, the samples produced correspond to RR intervals
and their timestamps. The data generator (or fake sensor) streams samples to the gateway which
is composed of: a broker and subscriber that receive the samples, a producer that aggregates them,
generates files of a fixed size, and streams them to the filesystem interface, and lastly a consumer
that fetches the processed data from the remote endpoint. To get a grasp on the volume of data a
single client generates, each sample is a couple of bytes and a healthy individual generates between
50 and 180 samples per minute. As a consequence, an average client generates around 230—690
Bytes of data per minute. This is indeed a low throughput but, as shown in Chapter 5, the system
can withhold way higher loads.
4.3 Threat Model
In this Section we cover our threat model and the main security assumptions we make. This is,
what kind of attacker our system is protected from. Vulnerabilities out of the scope of this project,
together with known issues are covered in §4.4. Firstly, we assume that the communication between
the gateway and the filesystem is kept protected (e.g., encrypted) using secure transfer protocols
(e.g. Secure File Transport Protocol (SFTP), more in Chapter 5). Secondly, we trust the whole
client package. Protecting it is out of the scope of this work, but suggestions are given in Chapter
7. Given these assumptions, our threat model is the same as typical systems that rely on SGX.
Specifically, we assume an attacker with access to system’s privileged software such as the OS,
VMM or BIOS. Our security perimeter only includes the internals of the CPU package and the
on-die memory. Most notably, the system’s main memory (DRAM) is left outside our security
perimeter. As a consequence, the traffic between enclave applications and main memory is kept
encrypted and is handled by the MEE [23]. The trusted computing base is Intel’s microcode
and the code loaded at the enclave, which can be measured and integrity checked. It is worth
noting that, any bug or security leak included in the application code loaded in the enclave might
compromise our security model.
4.4 Known Vulnerabilities
The threat model described in §4.3 is the same of SGX. As a consequence, and given our security
assumptions, it is sufficient to look into the known vulnerabilities of the latter. Providing protection
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from attacks outside of SGX’s threat model is out of the scope of this project. Intel’s MEE
is not designed to be an oblivious RAM, therefore an adversary could perform traffic analysis
attacks [23] against our system. This is, even if communication between the CPU and the DRAM
is kept encrypted, a smart attacker could infer information from patterns in the message exchanges.
However, current work enables oblivious computations on enclaves [40]. In March 2017, Schwarz
et. al. [49] unveiled a side-channel timing attack capable of extracting a full RSA key from an
enclave in under 5 minutes. Not long after, various countermeasures were made available [50,
51]. Speculative execution attacks (Spectre-like [52]) have also proven to be successful against
enclaves [53]. Lastly, Foreshadow [54] is another speculative execution attack stronger than its
predecessors and specifically targeted against Intel SGX.
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Chapter 5
Implementation
The aim of this chapter is to present the implementation details of our system. Each explanation
is accompanied, when required, by code snippets to further illustrate the rationale behind our
design choices. For the full implementation details we refer to Appendix A. The implementation
we will cover is the one the results presented in Chapter 6 are based on. As a consequence, and in
order to stress-test the system, we replace real sensors with synthetic data generators in the client
package first described in §4.2. All the different components introduced in Chapter 4 are packaged
in sets of Docker containers. Large fleets of concurrent users are then simulated using Docker’s
standalone clusters and mounted using docker-machine.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In §5.1 and §5.2 we cover the implementation de-
tails of the server-side and the client-side component respectively. Re-using Docker-specific nomen-
clature, we will refer to logical isolated functionalities packaged in a container as services. Sets
of services working collaboratively will be gathered and deployed as a component using docker-
compose. Collections (or clusters) of replicated components form swarms using docker-swarm.
Lastly, in §5.3 we cover how each service, component and swarm is deployed.
5.1 Server Implementation
We rely on the original SGX-Spark implementation, and we only modify it to support a different
in-enclave code deployment path, so that the .jar archive is available inside the enclaves and the
shared memory. To do so, we include our newly added module in the project’s pom.xml compilation
file, in the worker and driver initialization scripts and in the enclave generation Makefile so that
code is loaded in the enclave at compilation time. The before-mentioned module contains two
HRV processing algorithms and a benchmarking one: SDNN, HRVBands, and Identity. The SDNN
algorithm computes the standard deviation of NN (RR) intervals in a rolling basis, generating one
output per 10 seconds worth of samples. The HRVBands [55] performs a Discrete Fourier Transform
(DFT) of 10 seconds worth of samples, and computes the power of the low frequency and high
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frequency components, together with their ratio. Lastly, the Identity algorithm copies the input
to the output file. It is used to provide a baseline on the overhead the system is introducing. All
the application code is implemented in Spark’s binding for the Scala programming language [56].
We choose this particular binding since it is the only one supported by SGX-Spark’s compiler.
To be usable inside SGX enclaves, applications must adhere to the RDD [57] and DStreams [25]
API.
The particular implementation of these algorithms relies on basic Spark Streaming operators,
and their corresponding Scala counterparts. For instance, the filesystem interface is monitored
using DStream’s textFileStream method as exposed in Listing 5.1. There, variables and code
are initialized (lines 3-10) then the input directory is monitored (line 12) and the computation and
output are assigned. Note that data is not processed until the Streaming Context is started via
the start() method (line 22).
1 de f main ( args : Array [ S t r ing ] ) {
2 // I n i t i a l i z e v a r i a b l e s and Spark Contexts
3 va l wdwSize = 10
4 va l numClients = args (0 ) . t o In t
5 va l conf = new SparkConf ( ) . setAppName ( ”HRV Toolbox − SDNN” )
6 va l sc = new SparkContext ( conf )
7 va l s s c = new StreamingContext ( sc , Duration (10000) )
8
9 // I n i t i a l i z e the Estimate Class
10 va l estimateHRV = new EstimateHRVBands ( wdwSize )
11
12 // Monitor Input Di rec tory
13 va l dataStreamVec = f o r ( i <− 1 to numClients ) y i e l d s s c . t extF i l eSt ream ( ”csem
/ s r c /main/ r e s o u r c e s / csv /”+i . t oS t r i ng+”/
14 ” )
15 // Estimate
16 va l hrvBandVec = f o r (dS <− dataStreamVec ) y i e l d estimateHRV . es t imate (dS)
17 // Save as Output
18 f o r ( i <− 1 to numClients ) {
19 hrvBandVec ( i −1) . saveAsTextFi les ( ”csem/ s r c /main/ r e s o u r c e s / r e s u l t s /” + i .
t oS t r i ng + ”/sdnn” )
20 }
21 // Star t Stream Proce s s ing
22 s s c . s t a r t ( )
23 s s c . awaitTermination ( )
24 }
Listing 5.1: Snippet illustrating textFileStream functionality.
Lastly, the implementations of SDNN, HRVBands, and Identity can be found in Listings A.1, A.2,
and A.3 respectively.
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5.2 Client Implementation
Clients correspond to body-sensors strapped to the body of a user working collaboratively with a
smart gateway, sending gathered data to the cloud-based component. In a real deployment, the
sensor service in the client component would be an actual sensor (e.g. HR band, smartwatch, or
optical HR monitoring device) and the gateway would be implemented in a, for instance, Rasp-
berry Pi. For evaluation purposes (see Chapter 6), these services are simulated and virtualized.
This way, we can simulate a situation where multiple clients concurrently use the platform with-
out the hardware burden. As firstly introduced in §4.2, our implementation decouples the client
component into into five different services (see Figure 4.1, right).
1. The sensor service is a Python script that generates sample rate random samples per
second, where a sample is an RR interval and its timestamp, and publishes the information
to the artificial-data topic in a MQTT [58] broker located in the gateway. Listing 5.2
presents the part of the sensor source code where artificial data is generated and published.
The full source code is available in Listing A.4. Note the particularity of the sample gen-
eration procedure. First, sample rate random points in a [0, 1) uniform distribution are
generated (lines 18, 21). Then, current timestamps are inferred from them (line 24) and
intervals are computed as successive differences (line 25). These intervals are, in fact, the
RR intervals.
1 de f loop ( sample rate ) :
2 ””” Endless Sample Generation
3
4 This module i s the e n d l e s s loop that gene ra t e s <sample rate>
5 new samples per second and p u b l i s h e s them to a MQTT t o p i c .
6
7 Parameters
8 −−−−−−−−−−
9 sample rate : f l o a t
10 How many samples are generated per second
11 ”””
12 k i l l e r = K i l l e r ( )
13 g l o b a l CL ID
14 p a s t t s = time . time ( )
15 whi le 1 :
16 value = ””
17 # F i r s t we generate <sample rate> timestamps in one second
18 tstamps = [ i f o r i in random . uniform ( low=time . time ( ) ,
19 high=time . time ( ) + 1 ,
20 s i z e =( sample rate ) ) ]
21 tstamps . s o r t ( )
22 # Second we compute the i n t e r v a l s between them
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23 f o r i in tstamps :
24 tmp = datet ime . fromtimestamp ( i ) . s t r f t i m e ( ’%Y−%m−%d %H:%M:%S ’ )
25 value += tmp+’ , ’+s t r ( i n t ( ( i − p a s t t s ) ∗ 1e6 ) )+’ \n ’
26 p a s t t s = i
27 pub l i sh . s i n g l e ( ” a r t i f i c i a l −data−{}” . format (CL ID) , va lue )
28 time . s l e e p (1 )
29 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
30 pr in t ( ” Ex i t ing g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
31 break
Listing 5.2: Snippet illustrating the artificial data generation in the sensor service.
2. The eclipse-mqtt service is the mosquitto [59] implementation of the MQTT broker. We
rely on the public Docker image at Docker Hub [60]. It handles the samples generated
by sensor and delivers them to the mqtt-subscriber when the latter subscribes to the
artificial-data topic.
3. The mqtt-subscriber service is a Python script that subscribes to the artificial-data
MQTT topic and whenever it gathers FILE LINES (line 26) samples it generates a .csv
file at a specified location. The key functionality of the service, sample gathering and file
generation, is illustrated in Listing 5.3. The full service code is available in Listing A.5.
1 de f on message (mosq , obj , msg) :
2 ””” Cal lback method f o r the mosquitto c l i e n t .
3
4 Whenever the MQTT c l i e n t r e c e i v e s a new sample i t t r i g g e r s t h i s method .
5 When the cur rent count reaches the thresho ld , a new csv f i l e i s generated
6 and s to r ed in the l o c a l data d i r e c t o r y .
7
8 Parameters
9 −−−−−−−−−−
10 Parameters are those o f the standard implementation o f the MQTT c l i e n t
11 f o r Python .
12 ”””
13 g l o b a l count
14 g l o b a l c u r r s t r
15 g l o b a l FILE LINES
16 g l o b a l CL ID
17 g l o b a l LOCAL DATA DIR
18 g l o b a l k i l l e r
19 pr in t ( ” Received message” )
20 dcd msg = msg . payload . decode ( ” utf−8” ) . s p l i t ( ”\n” )
21 whole msg = [ i . s p l i t ( ” , ” ) f o r i in dcd msg i f i != ”” ]
22 f o r tmp in whole msg :
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23 d = datet ime . s t rpt ime (tmp [ 0 ] , ’%Y−%m−%d %H:%M:%S ’ )
24 time stamp = time . mktime (d . t imetup le ( ) )
25 r r = tmp [ 1 ]
26 i f count == FILE LINES :
27 g l o b a l TS
28 pr in t ( ” I t took : {} s ” . format ( time . time ( ) − TS) )
29 c u r r s t r += ” {} ,{} ” . format ( time stamp , r r )
30 t s = i n t ( time . time ( ) ∗1 e3 )
31 f i l ename = ”{}{} ” . format (LOCAL DATA DIR, CL ID)+s t r ( t s )+” . csv ”
32 t ry :
33 with open ( f i l ename , ”w+” ) as f :
34 f . wr i t e ( c u r r s t r )
35 except FileNotFoundError as e :
36 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
37 mosq . d i s connec t ( )
38 pr in t ( ” Ex i t ing g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
39 break
40 count = 0
41 c u r r s t r = ””
42 e l s e :
43 c u r r s t r += ” {} ,{}\n” . format ( time stamp , r r )
44 count += 1
45 e l s e :
46 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
47 mosq . d i s connec t ( )
48 pr in t ( ” Ex i t ing g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
Listing 5.3: Snippet of the data gathering and file generation in the mqtt-subscriber service.
4. The producer service is a Python script that monitors a local directory and, whenever a
new file is stored, sends it to the remote filesystem. The monitoring functionality is depicted
in Listing 5.4 and the full source code is available in Listing A.6. We keep track of the current
files in the directory with a dictionary (lines 175 and 180) and we compute the difference
between the pre and the post (line 181). We then transfer the new files over SFTP (line 188).
1 de f monitor ( ssh , s f tp , ∗ args ) :
2 ””” Sending daemon
3
4 This method s t a r t s an i n f i n i t e loop that every <SEND PERIOD> l o ok s f o r
5 newly added data f i l e s and c o p i e s them to a remote d i r e c t o r y .
6
7 Parameters
8 −−−−−−−−−−
9 ssh : paramiko . SSHClient
10 SSH Cl i en t connected to the remote host .
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11 s f t p : paramiko . SFTPClient
12 SFTP Cl i en t connected to the remote host .
13 ”””
14 g l o b a l LOCAL DATA DIR
15 path to watch = LOCAL DATA DIR
16 be f o r e = d i c t ( [ ( f , None ) f o r f in os . l i s t d i r ( path to watch ) ] )
17 g l o b a l SEND PERIOD
18 k i l l e r = K i l l e r ( )
19 whi le 1 :
20 time . s l e e p (SEND PERIOD)
21 a f t e r = d i c t ( [ ( f , None ) f o r f in os . l i s t d i r ( path to watch ) ] )
22 added = [ f f o r f in a f t e r i f f not in be f o r e ]
23 i f added :
24 f o r f in added :
25 l o c a l f i l e = LOCAL DATA DIR + s t r ( f )
26 g l o b a l REMOTE DATA DIR
27 r e m o t e f i l e = REMOTE DATA DIR + ”/” + s t r ( f )
28 s f t p . put ( l o c a l f i l e , r e m o t e f i l e )
29 os . remove ( l o c a l f i l e )
30 # I f the re are a l o t o f f i l e s , not check ing i n s i d e a l s o l e ad s
31 # to e r r o r with code 137
32 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
33 pr in t ( ” Ex i t ing g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
34 break
35 be f o r e = a f t e r
36 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
37 pr in t ( ” Ex i t ing g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
38 break
39 f o r d in os . l i s t d i r (LOCAL DATA DIR) :
40 t m p f i l e = LOCAL DATA DIR + s t r (d)
41 os . remove ( t m p f i l e )
Listing 5.4: Snippet illustrating the local directory monitoring in the producer service.
5. Similarly, the consumer service is a Python script that monitors the remote filesystem
and, whenever a result file is stored, fetches it to the local result directory. The monitoring
functionality is illustrated in Listing 5.5 and the whole source code is available in Listing A.7.
It is, in essence, symmetric to the one presented for the producer service. The only difference
is that, since sftp.get() does not support recursive invocations (e.g. -R flags), specific care
must be taken to fetch all the different files placed in the different directories.
1 de f monitor ( ssh , s f t p ) :
2 ””” Fetching daemon
3
25 5.2. Client Implementation
4 This method s t a r t s an i n f i n i t e loop that every <FETCH PERIOD> l o ok s f o r
5 newly added d i r e c t o r i e s and c o p i e s them to a l o c a l r e s u l t d i r e c t o r y .
6
7 Parameters
8 −−−−−−−−−−
9 ssh : paramiko . SSHClient
10 SSH Cl i en t connected to the remote host .
11 s f t p : paramiko . SFTPClient
12 SFTP Cl i en t connected to the remote host .
13 ”””
14 g l o b a l REMOTE RESULT DIR
15 g l o b a l FETCH PERIOD
16 g l o b a l LOCAL RESULT DIR
17 #pr in t (”CONSUMER: user −> {}” . format ( ge tpas s . g e tu s e r ( ) ) )
18 path to watch = REMOTE RESULT DIR
19 be f o r e = d i c t ( [ ( f , None ) f o r f in s f t p . l i s t d i r ( path to watch ) ] )
20 k i l l e r = K i l l e r ( )
21 whi le 1 :
22 time . s l e e p (FETCH PERIOD)
23 a f t e r = d i c t ( [ ( f , None ) f o r f in s f t p . l i s t d i r ( path to watch ) ] )
24 added = [ f f o r f in a f t e r i f f not in be f o r e ]
25 i f added :
26 f o r f in added :
27 l o c a l d i r = LOCAL RESULT DIR + s t r ( f ) + ”/”
28 r emote d i r = REMOTE RESULT DIR + ”/” + s t r ( f ) + ”/”
29 t ry :
30 os . mkdir ( l o c a l d i r )
31 g e t a l l ( s f tp , remote d ir , l o c a l d i r )
32 except F i l e E x i s t s E r r o r as e :
33 pr in t ( ” Fetching a f i l e that a l r eady e x i s t s ! ” )
34 be f o r e = a f t e r
35 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
36 pr in t ( ” Ex i t ing g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
37 break
38 f o r d in os . l i s t d i r (LOCAL RESULT DIR) :
39 tmp dir = LOCAL RESULT DIR + d
40 f o r f in os . l i s t d i r ( tmp dir ) :
41 t m p f i l e = tmp dir + ”/” + f
42 os . remove ( t m p f i l e )
43 os . rmdir ( tmp dir )
Listing 5.5: Snippet illustrating the remote filesystem monitoring in the consumer service.
All the services implemented in Python, amount to a total of 888 Lines of Code (LoC). As in-
troduced before, for the service deployment we rely on Docker. The corresponding Dockerfiles
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and docker-compose are presented in §5.3. Furthermore, the deployment of each service is also
wrapped in a Dockerfile and included in an image. Lastly, we remark that the communication
between the client and the server happens via SSH/SFTP to ensure transport layer security when
transferring user’s data.
5.3 Deployment
To ease scalability and reproducibility of both server and client, deployment is orchestrated by a
single script detached from both execution environments. This is done through a combination of
bash scripts that act as entry points for the Dockerfile and docker-compose file. We differentiate
between the server deployment (§5.3.1), the client deployment (§5.3.2) and the overall deployment
and evaluation (§5.3.3).
5.3.1 Server Execution Deployment
Specifying the remote location; the SGX-Spark engine, the streaming algorithm, and the filesys-
tem interface are initialized. Depending on whether we want to enable enclaves or not (SGX MODE,
line 24), a set of scripts (lines 25 and 26) are executed in the remote server using ssh.exec com-
mand(). The script then remains passive until a SIGTERM signal is captured, and all processes are
killed (lines 41-49). A snippet of the main functionality is attached in Listing 5.6 and the full
source code is available in Listing 5.3.1. Note that the code is intended to be launched from a
location different from the server (which we leave untrusted).
1 de f main ( ssh , s f t p ) :
2 ”””Main execut ion method
3
4 This method conta in s the main deployment o f UC1. I t b a s i c a l l y s t a r t s each
5 and every process , launches the benchmarking , and c l e a n s everyth ing when
6 execut ion has f i n i s h e d .
7
8 Notes
9 −−−−−
10 Al l the s l e e p s are p laced due to exper i enced e r r o r s race c o n d i t i o n s . As a
11 consequence t h e i r arguments are complete ly e m p i r i c a l .
12
13 Arguments
14 −−−−−−−−−
15 ssh : paramiko . SSHClient
16 SSH Cl i en t to the remote s e r v e r .
17 s f t p : paramiko . SFTPClient
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18 SFTP Cl i en t to the remote s e r v e r .
19 ”””
20 g l o b a l ALGORITHM
21 g l o b a l SGX MODE
22 g l o b a l NUM CLIENTS
23 algo name = ” . / launch−csem−{}. sh {}” . format (ALGORITHM, NUM CLIENTS)
24 i f SGX MODE:
25 s c r i p t l i s t = [ ” . / master . sh” , ” . / worker . sh” , ” . / worker−enc lave . sh” ,
26 ” . / dr ive r−enc lave . sh” , algo name ]
27 e l s e :
28 s c r i p t l i s t = [ ” . / master . sh” , ” . / worker . sh” , algo name ]
29 f o r s c r i p t in s c r i p t l i s t :
30 in , out , e r r = ssh . exec command ( ”cd sgx−spark ; {} &” . format ( s c r i p t ) )
31 time . s l e e p (3 )
32 tmp command = ” dsta t − l −−noco lo r −−noheaders 10 > cpu load . csv ”
33 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ”cd sgx−spark ; {} &” . format ( tmp command) )
34 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
35 k i l l e r = K i l l e r ( )
36 whi le 1 :
37 time . s l e e p (1 )
38 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
39 pr in t ( ” K i l l i n g Grace fu l l y ! ” )
40 break
41 f o r s c r i p t in s c r i p t l i s t :
42 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ” k i l l $ ( pgrep −f ’{} ’ ) ” . format ( s c r i p t ) )
43 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
44 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ” k i l l $ ( pgrep −f ’ java ’ ) ” )
45 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
46 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ” k i l l $ ( pgrep −f ’ d s ta t ’ ) ” )
47 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
48 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ”rm /dev/shm/∗” )
49 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
50 re turn 0
Listing 5.6: Main method of the Server-Side Deployment Script.
5.3.2 Client Execution Deployment
The client deployment procedure is more complicated than the server’s one since we support
executions of variable number of clients, which are instantiated at start-up time. In short, when
the number of clients is set, the platform starts a standalone Docker cluster (or swarm). However,
once started with the scalability tests, we recalled that the number of clients a cluster whose
network relies on Docker’s default bridge adapter can support was too small. At 20 clients, the
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engine ran out of local IP addresses and executions would systematically fail. As a consequence, we
decided to virtualize a local standalone cluster using docker-machine. This latter functionality
enables the deployment of several Docker engines in a single computing instance. To do so, a
virtual machine must be started for each engine, and special care must be taken to set up the
network, so that all containers are reachable from the others.
Even though the full script is rather long, given its complexity and how crucial it is to the
system’s performance, we attach it entirely in Listing 5.7. We firstly deploy a name discovery
service based on the Consul [61] docker image, the aim of which is to keep track of all the
generated virtual machines, and assign an IP address to each one (lines 27-36). Secondly, we start
dNUM CLIENTS/20e virtual machines and register them with the name discovery service (lines 40-
60). These set of virtual machines will form our Docker Swarm. As a consequence, it is important
to elect one (first by default) as our swarm-master. Note that, in order to speed up the start-up
time, the images for all the client services are compressed and pre-loaded to the virtual machines
(lines 62-66). In third place, we create the overlay network (lines 70-71). Then, the local directories
for each client in each virtual machine must be mounted and mirrored outside the virtual machine
so that we can process the results. This is done using SSHF in lines 76-85. Lastly, each client is
deployed using the specific docker-compose file (see Listing A.9).
1 #! / bin /bash
2
3 s e t −a
4
5 # Prede f ined enviroment v a r i a b l e s
6 source docker−env . env
7
8 # Pul l MQTT image
9 docker−compose p u l l mqtt
10
11 # Max Containers per Host
12 MAX CONTAINERS=2
13
14 # Input Parameters
15 SAMPLE RATE=${1}
16 NUM CLIENTS=${2}
17 FILE LINES=${3}
18
19 NUM HOSTS=$ ( ( $ ( ( $NUM CLIENTS / $MAX CONTAINERS ) ) + 1) )
20
21 # To int roduce an a b s t r a c t i o n layer , even i f the re i s no r e a l need f o r an
22 # over lay network ( the br idge i t s e l f s u f f i c e s ) we c r e a t e an e x t e r n a l machine
23 # anyways . This may be an o v e r k i l l f o r very smal l execut i ons but i s introduced
24 # to pre s e rve s c a l a b i l i t y t ransparent to the user .
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25
26 # We f i r s t c r e a t e the Consul d i s cove ry s e r v i c e ( key/ value s t o r e )
27 docker−machine c r e a t e \
28 −d v i r tua lbox \
29 −−v i r tua lbox−boot2docker−u r l ˜/tmp/ boot2docker . i s o \
30 mh−keys to r e
31 eva l ”$ ( docker−machine env mh−keys to r e ) ”
32 docker run −d \
33 −−name consu l \
34 −p ” 8500:8500 ” \
35 −h ” consu l ” \
36 consu l agent −s e r v e r −boots t rap −c l i e n t ” 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 ”
37
38 # We then c r e a t e the Swarm c l u s t e r the f i r s t node ( id == 1) w i l l be the swarm
39 # manager .
40 f o r HOST ID in $ ( seq 1 ${NUM HOSTS}) ;
41 do
42 i f [ $HOST ID == 1 ] ; then
43 docker−machine c r e a t e \
44 −d v i r tua lbox \
45 −−v i r tua lbox−boot2docker−u r l ˜/tmp/ boot2docker . i s o \
46 −−swarm −−swarm−master \
47 −−swarm−d i s cove ry=” consu l : // $ ( docker−machine ip mh−keys to r e ) :8500 ” \
48 −−engine−opt=” c l u s t e r−s t o r e=consu l : // $ ( docker−machine ip mh−keys to r e )
:8500 ” \
49 −−engine−opt=” c l u s t e r−a d v e r t i s e=eth1 :2376 ” \
50 ”sgx−csem−host−$HOST ID”
51 e l s e
52 docker−machine c r e a t e \
53 −d v i r tua lbox \
54 −−v i r tua lbox−boot2docker−u r l ˜/tmp/ boot2docker . i s o \
55 −−swarm \
56 −−swarm−d i s cove ry=” consu l : // $ ( docker−machine ip mh−keys to r e ) :8500 ” \
57 −−engine−opt=” c l u s t e r−s t o r e=consu l : // $ ( docker−machine ip mh−keys to r e )
:8500 ” \
58 −−engine−opt=” c l u s t e r−a d v e r t i s e=eth1 :2376 ” \
59 ”sgx−csem−host−$HOST ID”
60 f i
61 eva l $ ( docker−machine env ”sgx−csem−host−$HOST ID” )
62 docker load − i ˜/tmp/consumer . ta r
63 docker load − i ˜/tmp/deployment . ta r
64 docker load − i ˜/tmp/ fake−s enso r . ta r
65 docker load − i ˜/tmp/mqtt−sub . ta r
66 docker load − i ˜/tmp/ producer . ta r
67 done
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68
69 # We now c r e a t e the over l ay network
70 eva l $ ( docker−machine env −−swarm sgx−csem−host−1)
71 docker network c r e a t e −−d r i v e r over l ay −−subnet =10 .0 .0 .0/16 sgx−csem−net
72
73 f o r CL ID in $ ( seq 1 ${NUM CLIENTS}) ;
74 do
75 # Prepare environment
76 H ID=$ ( ( $ ( ( $CL ID / $MAX CONTAINERS ) ) + 1) )
77 mkdir −p ${LOCAL DATA DIR}${CL ID}
78 mkdir −p ${LOCAL RESULT DIR}${CL ID}
79 eva l $ ( docker−machine env ”sgx−csem−host−$H ID” )
80 docker−machine ssh ”sgx−csem−host−$H ID” mkdir −p ” r e s u l t s /${CL ID}”
81 docker−machine mount ”sgx−csem−host−$H ID” : ”/home/ docker / r e s u l t s /$CL ID” \
82 ${LOCAL RESULT DIR}${CL ID}
83 docker−machine ssh ”sgx−csem−host−$H ID” mkdir −p ” data /${CL ID}”
84 docker−machine mount ”sgx−csem−host−$H ID” : ”/home/ docker / data /$CL ID” \
85 ${LOCAL DATA DIR}${CL ID}
86
87 # Deploy c o n t a i n e r s (Add a −d at the end f o r detach mode)
88 cat ${COMPOSE FILE} | envsubst | docker−compose −f − −p \
89 ”${PROJECT NAME}−${CL ID}” up &
90 s l e e p 5
91 done
92
93 # Return to d e f a u l t environment be f o r e e x i t i n g
94 eva l $ ( docker−machine env −u)
Listing 5.7: Client Cluster Deployment Script.
5.3.3 Deployment
The main entry point for the platform’s deployment is included in Listing 5.8. It first loads a set
of environment variables and parses the input (lines 6,8-12), it then deploys the client cluster as
detailed in §5.3.2, and it lastly deploys the server container as detailed in §5.3.1.
1 #! / bin /bash
2
3 s e t −a
4
5 # Prede f ined enviroment v a r i a b l e s
6 source execut ion . env
7
8 ALGORITHM=${1}
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9 SGX MODE=${2}
10 SAMPLE RATE=${3}
11 NUM CLIENTS=${4}
12 FILE LINES=${5}
13
14 # Deploy Cl ient−Side conta ine r
15 cd ${CLIENT DIR}
16 bash ${CLIENT DIR}/ deploy−c l i e n t . sh ${SAMPLE RATE} ${NUM CLIENTS} ${FILE LINES}
17 cd ${WDIR}
18
19 # Deploy Server−Side Conta iners
20 cat ${COMPOSE FILE} | envsubst | docker−compose −f − −p ”${PROJECT NAME}” up &
Listing 5.8: Main entry point for a single execution.
Additionally, a Python script wraps the launcher presented in Listing 5.8 in order to con-
veniently orchestrate execution batches for evaluation purposes. The same script (attached in
Listing A.10) also includes the queries to obtain the required metrics for the different benchmark-
ing scenarios that we will present in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation
The aim of this Chapter is to present the experimental evaluation of our system. Firstly, in §6.1
we introduce the hardware used for the benchmarking. We differentiate between the machines
and software used in the Server-side §6.1.1 and those used in the Client-side §6.1.2 since both
components have very different requirements. Secondly, we cover the different experimental con-
figurations considered in §6.2. The latter require a given number of metrics that we present in
§6.3. The workloads used to assess the performance are presented and justified in §6.4. Lastly,
our results are presented and analyzed in §6.5. In a nutshell, our experiments answer the following
questions: (i) is the design of the platform sound? (ii) is our implementation efficient, (iii) what
is the overhead of SGX, and (iv) is it scalable?
6.1 Hardware Settings
6.1.1 Server
The server side is where the filesystem interface is hosted and where the SGX-Spark jobs run.
Therefore, it must be be equipped with Intel SGX and enclave mode must be enabled. The
component runs on a machine located at the University of Neuchaˆtel’s (UniNe) cluster with Intel R©
Xeon R© CPU E3-1270 v6 @ 3.80 GHz with 8 cores and 64 GiB RAM. We use Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
(kernel 4.19.0-41900-generic) and the official Intel R© SGX driver v2.0 [62], and SGX-LKL [26].
We use an internal release of the SGX-Spark framework, which is currently under development.
6.1.2 Client
For evaluation purposes, and as introduced in the Implementation Chapter (5), the whole set of
clients is deployed as a standalone Docker swarm in a single computing instance. The machine
we are using is located in UniNe’s cluster and is equipped with two AMD EPYC 7281 16-Core
Processor which, taking hyperthreading into consideration, account for a total of 64 cores and 64
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GiB RAM. It is deployed with Ubuntu v18.04 LTS (kernel 4.15.0-42-generic). The client containers
are built and deployed using Docker (v18.09.0) and docker-compose (v1.23.2). We use docker-
machine (v0.16.0) with the virtualbox disk image. Each machine hosts 20 clients, the maximum
number of services supported by its local network, and it registers itself to the Swarm via a
name discovery service running on another machine (we rely on Consul [61]). Inter-container
communication is established using the overlay network driver. To optimize start up time we
provide all the images via .tar files that are loaded to the VM, skipping image building time, and
we use a local copy of virtualbox’s disk image. In order to gather the results, we mount a Docker
volume on each client and mirror the VM to the real filesystem using Secure SHell File System
(SSHFS). We pull the latest images available on Docker Hub for the Consul name discovery service
(v1.4) and the eclipse-mosquitto (v1.5) message broker.
6.2 Experimental Configuration
In order to evaluate the overhead SGX-Spark and our system introduce, we compare three
different settings or execution modes:
1. The vanilla Spark mode acts as our baseline. It executes the algorithm using a standard
distribution of the Spark cluster-computing framework.
2. The SGX-Spark w/o Enclaves mode is an SGX-Spark execution but with the enclaves
disabled. This is, the engine sets up the collaborative JVM scheme communicating over
SHM, but neither runs inside an enclave.
3. The SGX-Spark w/ Enclaves mode is the execution mode of our system. It runs unmod-
ified Spark applications leveraging SGX for sensitive computations.
The current implementation of SGX-Spark (still under development) does not provide support for
Spark’s Streaming Context inside enclaves. To overcome this temporary limitation, we evaluate
the SDNN and Identity algorithms in batch and stream mode. For the former, all three different
execution modes are supported. For the latter, we present estimated results for SGX-Spark with
enclaves enabled, basing the computation time on the batch execution times and the additional
overhead against the other modes.
The algorithms are fed with a data file or a data stream, respectively. We increment the input
workload (see §6.4) and measure the impact it has on the execution time (see §6.3). In batch mode,
a result file is generated once the processing is finished. In the streaming scenario, an output file
is generated every ten seconds. In a multi-client scenario, each client has a separated data stream
(or file) and consequently a different result file. A streaming execution consists of 5 minutes of the
service operating with a specific execution mode, client configuration, and input workload. We
execute our experiments 5 times and report average values together with their standard deviations.
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6.3 Analyzed Metrics
To assess performance, scalability, and efficiency, we consider two different metrics depending on
whether we run in batch or stream mode: elapsed time and average batch processing time 1.
1. Elapsed Time measures the time it takes the engine to process the input file. In short,
it is our system’s execution time in batch mode. To obtain this metric it is sufficient with
introducing logs (measuring time) in the application code.
2. Average Batch Processing Time takes the average of the time it takes the platform to
process each 10-second-long chunk of the input data stream. To obtain this value we query
Spark’s REST API [63]. We use Python’s requests package as depicted in Listing 6.1.
Since the server, the clients, and the deployment might be hosted in different locations, the
easiest way to query the REST API instantiated by the master process at the server is to
establish a SSH tunnel and forward the contents in the server’s 4040 port to localhost.
This is done in line 9 using an additional Python script that we attach in Listing B.1 (see
also Listing B.2). Note that in the latter there are configuration-specific parameters. Once
the port forwarding is established, we set up and execute the request (lines 11-14) and then
process the results (lines 16-20). It is worth mentioning that, since Spark keeps an historic of
the batch processing times, it is sufficient with doing only one query right before we terminate
the 5-minute-long execution.
1 de f que ry ba t ch proc e s s i ng ( f i l e d i r ) :
2 ”””Query Spark ’ s REST API
3
4 This method q u e r i e s sparks API f o r the batch p r o c e s s i n g time . I t f i r s t s
5 l aunches a port forwarding daemon in order to be ab le to perform the
6 r eque s t and then q u e r i e s the in fo rmat ion . Note that t h i s i s done only
7 once at the end o f the execut ion ( r i g h t be f o r e k i l l i n g i t ) .
8 ”””
9 proc = subproces s . Popen ( ”python3 port fo rward . py” . s p l i t ( ” ” ) )
10 time . s l e e p (2 )
11 app id = r e q u e s t s . get ( ’ http :// l o c a l h o s t :4040/ api /v1/ a p p l i c a t i o n s / ’ ) . j s on ( )
12 app id = app id [ 0 ] [ ’ id ’ ]
13 req = ’ http :// l o c a l h o s t :4040/ api /v1/ a p p l i c a t i o n s /{}/ jobs / ’ . format ( app id )
14 r = r e q u e s t s . get ( req ) . j son ( )
15 t ime format = ”%Y−%m−%dT%H:%M:%S.% f ”
16 t imes = [ datet ime . s t rpt ime ( r [ i ] [ ’ completionTime ’ ] [ : − 3 ] ,
17 t ime format ) . timestamp ( ) −
1 Note that we mention batch in two different contexts: batch execution (one static input and static output) and
streaming batches. Spark Streaming divides live input data in chunks called batches determined by a time duration
(10 seconds in our experiments). The time it takes the engine to process the data therein contained is denoted as
batch processing time.
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18 datet ime . s t rpt ime ( r [ i ] [ ’ submissionTime ’ ] [ : − 3 ] ,
19 t ime format ) . timestamp ( )
20 f o r i in r eve r s ed ( range ( l en ( r ) ) ) i f ’ completionTime ’ in r [ i ] ]
21 proc . k i l l ( )
22 f i l ename = f i l e d i r + ” b a t c h p r o c e s s i n g t i m e s . csv ”
23 with open ( f i l ename , ”w+” ) as f :
24 f o r num, va l in enumerate ( t imes ) :
25 i f num == 0 :
26 f . wr i t e ( ”{} {}” . format (num, va l ) )
27 e l s e :
28 f . wr i t e ( ”\n{} {}” . format (num, va l ) )
29 re turn 0
Listing 6.1: Snippet illustrating a query to Spark’s REST API.
We study the variability of these two parameters as we modify the input workload according to
§6.4.
6.4 Workload
As firstly introduced in Chapter §2.2, the clients inject streams as cardiac signals corresponding to
RR intervals and their timestamps. Each client injects a modest workload into our system (230 -
690 bytes per minute). Hence, to assess the efficiency and the processing time as well as to uncover
Table 6.1: Different input loads used for Batch Mode (BM) and Streaming Mode (SM). We present
the sample rate they simulate (i.e. how many RR intervals are streamed per second) and the overall
file or stream size (Input Load).
Experiment s rate (samples / sec) Input Load
BM - Small Load {44, 89, 178, 356, 712, 1424} {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32} kB
SM - Small Load {44, 89, 178, 356, 712, 1424} {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32} kB / sec
BM - Big Load {44, 89, 178, 356, 712, 1424} ∗ 1024 {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32} MB
SM - Big Load {44, 89, 178, 356, 712, 1424} ∗ 1024 {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32} MB / sec
possible bottlenecks, we scale up the output rate of these signals with the goal of inducing more
aggressive workloads into the system. We do so in detriment of medical realism, since arbitrary
input workloads do not relate to any medical situation or condition. Table 6.1 shows the variations
used to evaluate the various execution modes. On the leftmost column, BM and SM stand for batch
and stream mode execution. For each mode, we consider a small load and a big load evaluation
setting. We present both the sample rate parameter passed to the sensor component and the
total workload that amounts to (in multiples of bytes per second).
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6.5 Results
In this Section we present and analyze the evolution of the different metrics (§6.3) as we vary the
input workload (§6.4) for the different execution modes (§6.2). We firstly present the results for
batch mode in §6.5.1 and then we do the same for stream mode in §6.5.2.
6.5.1 Batch Execution
The exact configuration for the study of the elapsed time as we vary the input file size is: one
client, one master, one driver, one worker, and a variable input file that progressively increases
in size. We measure the elapsed time of each execution and present the average and standard
deviation of a total of five experiments with the same configuration. Results obtained are included
in Figure 6.1.
From the bar plot we highlight that the variance between execution times among same execution
modes as we increase the input file size is relatively low. However, it exponentiates as we reach
input files of 4-8 MB. We also observe that the slow-down factor between execution modes remains
also quite static until reaching the before mentioned load threshold. SGX-Spark with enclaves
(and hence our system), if input files are smaller than 4 MB, increases execution times x4-5 when
compared to vanilla Spark and x1.5-2 when compared to SGX-Spark with enclaves disabled.
Note that, since a single client in our real use case streams around 230 to 690 bytes per minute,
the current input size limitation already enables several hundreds of concurrent clients (considering
processing time as the only bottleneck).
6.5.2 Stream Execution
Similarly as done in §6.5.1, we scale the load of the data streams that feed the platform and study
the evolution of the average batch processing time. We deploy one worker, one driver and one
client, query the average batch processing time to Spark’s REST API, and present the results for
the Identity and SDNN algorithms. Results are summarized in Figure 6.2.
We obtain results for vanilla Spark, and SGX-Spark without enclaves, and we estimate them
for SGX-Spark with enclaves. We observe similar behaviours as those in Figure 6.1. Variability
among same execution modes when increasing the input stream size is low until reaching values
of around 4 to 8 MB per second. Similarly, the slow-down factor from vanilla Spark to SGX-
Spark without enclaves remains steady at around x2-2.5 until reaching the load threshold. As
a consequence, it is reasonable to estimate that the behaviour of SGX-Spark with enclaves will
preserve a similar slow-down factor (×4-×5) when compared with vanilla Spark in streaming jobs.
Similarly, the execution time will increase linearly with the input load after crossing the load
threshold of 4 MB. Note as well how different average batch processing times are in comparison
with elapsed times, in spite of relatively behaving similar. This is due to the fact that the average
of streaming batch processing times smoothens the initial overhead of starting the Spark engine.
Furthermore, in stream mode, data loading times are hidden under previous batches’ execution
times, and, again, smoothened by the average.
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Figure 6.1: Evolution of the average elapsed time, together with its standard deviation, as we
increase the size of the input file. We compare the three different execution modes for each
algorithm. Mode SGX-Spark w/ enclaves is the mode the platform runs in.
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Figure 6.2: Evolution of the average batch processing time as we increase the input stream size.
We compare the results of the three different execution modes. Note that those corresponding to
SGX-Spark w/ enclaves are estimated basing on the results in Figure 6.1 and the slow-down with
respect to the other execution modes.
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Chapter 7
Future Work
There are several dimensions along which the current project can be improved. We differentiate
between possible improvements to the current architecture as presented in Chapter 4, and further
research lines to enrich the privacy-preserving computing state of the art.
With regard to the project here presented, there are different issues that would need to be
addressed in the coming work. Firstly, the current SGX-Spark implementation, as mentioned in
Chapter 6, does not yet have support for in-enclave streaming. As a consequence, the estimated
results should be validated once the Streaming API is supported by SGX-Spark. Secondly,
results concerning client scalability should also be included in the evaluation chapter. Following
the deployment technique (standalone Docker cluster) indicated in §5.3, we have managed to run
experiments with hundreds of clients. However, due to time constraints, we have not been able
to provide an exhaustive assessment of the system’s scalability, i.e. how many clients it can run
in parallel, neither of how the overhead introduced by SGX-Spark might affect the number of
clients our platform can handle simultaneously. On the same lines, we would like to study the cost
of deploying our system over public cloud infrastructures such as AWS Confidential Computing.
Lastly, we intend to deploy the platform in a real use case, this is, using real data produced by
real users and streamed through a smart gateway.
On a more general note, we think that our threat model, as presented in §4.3, could be very
much improved by securing the client package. To do so, we envision the use of ARM TrustZone,
widely available in low-power devices (e.g., Raspberry PI), to reduce the TCB in the client-side of
the architecture whilst still leveraging on Trusted Execution Environments. Finally, were TEEs
to be used to secure the client package, a point-to-point, TEE-to-TEE, communication could be
leveraged instead of relying on standard secure transfer protocols. This way, data would never leave
the TEE (to be included in a SFTP package and sent over the network), hence reducing the overall
attack surface. Even though generic TEE-to-TEE point-to-point communication protocols might
not be mature enough yet (for generic TEEs on each endpoint), there are for instance solutions
for enclave-to-enclave [42] secure link establishment.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have presented a proof of concept of a streaming platform that grants executions
on remote, untrusted, servers or clouds with data and code confidentiality and integrity. We
provide end-to-end protection transparently to the developer since we run unmodified Apache
Spark applications inside Intel SGX’s enclaves.
Our design easily scales to different types of data generators, data streams, or even processing
algorithms. It only relies on SGX-Spark, a stream processing framework. However, this depen-
dency could also be overlooked since the server component in our architecture is also pluggable
and modular.
We have quantified the impact on overall system performance when protecting health sensitive
data from an untrusted cloud provider. More precisely, when performing an HRV analysis, for
files smaller than 4 MB, it introduces a x4-5 slow-down when compared to vanilla Apache Spark
both in batch and streaming execution mode. A good part of this slow-down though, is due to the
collaborative JVM structure adopted in SGX-Spark. For a matter of fact, a slow-down of only
x1.5-2 is introduced when moving from SGX-Spark with enclaves disabled to enclave-enabled
mode. Regardless, these results are already competitive when compared to other S.o.A privacy-
preserving processing engines [40]. Therefore, we consider our platform to be mature enough
to be introduced in a production environment, since it complies with current data protection
regulations whilst still maintaining a reasonable performance, and keeping the costs to use the
cloud infrastructure reasonable. Lastly, the work here presented is a work in progress for there are
still several issues to address that could further improve the overall performance and the overall
security of the platform, see Chapter 7.
To put it in a nutshell, this thesis covers the motivation, design, implementation, and analysis
of a proof of concept of a privacy-preserving streaming platform. The quality of the results here
obtained is backed by the publication of two conference papers [1, 2].
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Appendix A
Implementation Code Snippets
A.1 Server-Side Algorithms
1 /∗∗ Estimation o f the Standard Deviat ion between NN i n t e r v a l s .
2 ∗
3 ∗ @cons t ruc to r c r e a t e a new es t imat i on s u i t e .
4 ∗ @param wdwSize durat ion in seconds o f the window in which we compute
5 ∗ the standard dev i a t i on .
6 ∗/
7 c l a s s EstimateSDNN ( wdwSize : Int ) {
8
9 /∗∗ Estimation o f the SDNN with a f i x e d window in streaming mode
10 ∗
11 ∗ @return r e tu rn s a DStream conta in ing a tup l e per l i n e conta in ing the time
12 ∗ block / i n t e r v a l ( s t a r t i n g from zero ) and the SDNN value .
13 ∗/
14 de f sdnn ( dataStream : DStream [ St r ing ] ) : DStream [ ( Str ing , Double ) ] = {
15 va l operatorByKey = new StreamOperators ( wdwSize )
16 operatorByKey . sumSquareByKey ( dataStream )
17 . j o i n ( operatorByKey . cardinalByKey ( dataStream ) )
18 . map( udfDivide )
19 . j o i n ( operatorByKey . avgByKey( dataStream ) )
20 . map( udfSqrtDi f )
21 . map( udfTimesWindow )
22 }
23
24 }
Listing A.1: Implementation of the SDNN algorithm.
1 package org . apache . spark . csem . u t i l s
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2
3 import org . apache . spark . rdd .RDD
4 import org . apache . spark . streaming . dstream . DStream
5 import org . apache . spark . csem . u t i l s . StreamOperators
6
7 import s c a l a . math .{pow , cos , s in , Pi , f l o o r }
8
9 /∗∗ Set o f s i g n a l p r o c e s s i n g ope ra to r s de f ined on (K, V) , ( Str ing , Float )
10 ∗ DStreams . Current ly the methods inc luded in t h i s s u i t e are : DFT,
11 ∗
12 ∗ @cons t ruc to r c r e a t e a new operator s u i t e .
13 ∗ @param wdwSize durat ion in seconds o f the window in which we compute
14 ∗ the standard dev i a t i on .
15 ∗/
16 c l a s s StreamSigna lProces s ing ( wdwSize : Int ) extends S e r i a l i z a b l e {
17
18 /∗∗ Preproce s s e s the input data stream ( which conta in s l i n e s from the csv
19 ∗ input f i l e ) to the f o l l o w i n g format , (k , v ) where :
20 ∗ − k : i s the 10 second block i d e n t i f i e r ( key )
21 ∗ − v : i t e r a b l e with a l l the r r ’ s from that block indexed .
22 ∗
23 ∗ @return A data stream with the s p e c i f i e d format .
24 ∗/
25 de f preProces s ( dataStream : DStream [ St r ing ] ) :
26 DStream [ ( Str ing , I t e r a b l e [ ( Double , Int ) ] , Int ) ] = {
27 dataStream
28 . map( l i n e => ( f l o o r ( l i n e . s p l i t ( ” , ” ) (0 ) . toDouble /10) . t o In t . toStr ing ,
29 l i n e . s p l i t ( ” , ” ) (1 ) . toDouble ) )
30 . groupByKey ( )
31 . map( l i n e => ( l i n e . 1 , l i n e . 2 . zipWithIndex , l i n e . 2 . s i z e ) )
32 }
33
34 /∗∗ Compute the squared module o f the D i s c r e t e Four i e r Transform o f the
35 ∗ samples conta ined in the DStream .
36 ∗
37 ∗ @return r e tu rn s a DStream conta in ing a tup l e per l i n e conta in ing the time
38 ∗ block / i n t e r v a l ( s t a r t i n g from zero ) and the sum of a l l the va lue s
39 ∗ in that same i n t e r v a l .
40 ∗/
41 de f modDFT2( dataStream : DStream [ St r ing ] ) :
42 DStream [ ( Str ing , Double , Double , Double ) ] = {
43
44 // Aux i l i a ry methods to compute the squared modulus o f the DFT
45 de f cosDFT( l i n e : ( Str ing , I t e r a b l e [ ( Double , Int ) ] , Int ) , f i n d e x : Int ) :
46 Double = {
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47 l i n e . 2
48 . map( x => x . 1 ∗ cos (2∗Pi∗x . 2 ∗ f i n d e x / l i n e . 3 ) )
49 . reduce ( ( a , b) => ( a+b) )
50 }
51 de f sinDFT ( l i n e : ( Str ing , I t e r a b l e [ ( Double , Int ) ] , Int ) , f i n d e x : Int ) :
52 Double = {
53 l i n e . 2
54 . map( x => x . 1 ∗ s i n (2∗Pi∗x . 2 ∗ f i n d e x / l i n e . 3 ) )
55 . reduce ( ( a , b) => ( a+b) )
56 }
57
58 // Compute the Square Modulus o f the DFT
59 de f modDFT( value : ( Double , Int ) ,
60 l i n e : ( Str ing , I t e r a b l e [ ( Double , Int ) ] , Int ) ) : ( Double , Int ) = {
61 (pow(cosDFT( l i n e , va lue . 2 ) , 2) + pow( sinDFT ( l i n e , va lue . 2 ) , 2) ,
62 value . 2 )
63 }
64
65 // Pred i cate to know i f a va lue be longs to the High Freq . Component
66 de f i sHighFreq ( va lue : ( Double , Int ) , c a r d i n a l : Int ) : Boolean = {
67 va l thr low = ( 0 . 1 5 ∗ c a r d i n a l ) . t o In t
68 va l th r h i gh = ( 0 . 4 ∗ c a r d i n a l ) . t o In t
69 value . 2 match {
70 case x i f thr low u n t i l th r h i gh conta in s x => t rue
71 case => f a l s e
72 }
73 }
74
75 // Pred i cate to know i f a va lue be longs to the Low Freq . Component
76 de f isLowFreq ( va lue : ( Double , Int ) , c a r d i n a l : Int ) : Boolean = {
77 va l thr low = ( 0 . 0 4 ∗ c a r d i n a l ) . t o In t
78 va l th r h i gh = ( 0 . 1 5 ∗ c a r d i n a l ) . t o In t
79 value . 2 match {
80 case x i f thr low u n t i l th r h i gh conta in s x => t rue
81 case => f a l s e
82 }
83 }
84
85 va l tmp = preProces s ( dataStream )
86 . map( l => ( l . 1 , l . 2 .map( l i s t => modDFT( l i s t , l ) ) , l . 3 ) )
87
88 // High Frequency Component
89 va l highFreq = tmp
90 . map( l i n e => ( l i n e . 1 , l i n e . 2
91 . f i l t e r ( x => i sHighFreq (x , l i n e . 3 ) )
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92 . map( x => x . 1 )
93 . f o l d L e f t ( 0 . toDouble ) ( ( a , b ) => ( a + b) ) , l i n e . 3 ) )
94 . map( l i n e => ( l i n e . 1 , l i n e . 2 / pow( l i n e . 3 , 2) ∗ 2) )
95
96 // Low Frequency Component
97 va l lowFreq = tmp
98 . map( l i n e => ( l i n e . 1 , l i n e . 2
99 . f i l t e r ( x => isLowFreq (x , l i n e . 3 ) )
100 . map( x => x . 1 )
101 . f o l d L e f t ( 0 . toDouble ) ( ( a , b ) => ( a + b) ) , l i n e . 3 ) )
102 . map( l i n e => ( l i n e . 1 , l i n e . 2 / pow( l i n e . 3 , 2) ∗ 2) )
103 lowFreq
104 . j o i n ( highFreq )
105 . map( x => ( x . 1 , x . 2 . 1 , x . 2 . 2 , x . 2 . 1 / x . 2 . 2 ) )
106 }
107 }
108
109
110 /∗∗ Estimation o f the f requency bands g iven a HRV sequence .
111 ∗
112 ∗ @cons t ruc to r c r e a t e a new es t imat i on s u i t e .
113 ∗ @param wdwSize durat ion in seconds o f the window in which we es t imate
114 ∗ the f requency bands .
115 ∗/
116 c l a s s EstimateHRVBands ( wdwSize : Int ) {
117 /∗∗ Estimation o f the SDNN with a f i x e d window in streaming mode
118 ∗
119 ∗ @return r e tu rn s a DStream conta in ing a tup l e per l i n e conta in ing the time
120 ∗ block / i n t e r v a l ( s t a r t i n g from zero ) and the SDNN value .
121 ∗/
122 de f e s t imate ( dataStream : DStream [ St r ing ] ) :
123 DStream [ ( Str ing , Double , Double , Double ) ] = {
124 va l processingByKey = new StreamSigna lProces s ing ( wdwSize )
125 processingByKey .modDFT2( dataStream )
126 }
127 }
Listing A.2: Implementation of the HRVBands algorithm.
1 /∗∗ Main a p p l i c a t i o n / c l a s s that launches the i d e n t i t y a p p l i c a t i o n .
[ 6 4/18 0 ]
2 ∗
3 ∗ @note We implement the i d e n t i t y a p p l i c a t i o n that
4 ∗ b a s i c a l l y does nothing . This way we w i l l be ab le to measure e a s i l y the
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5 ∗ system ’ s overhead .
6 ∗/
7 ob j e c t I d e n t i t y extends Logging {
8
9 de f main ( args : Array [ S t r ing ] ) {
10
11 // I n i t i a l i z e Var i ab l e s and Spark Context
12 va l numClients = args (0 ) . t o In t
13 va l conf = new SparkConf ( ) . setAppName ( ”HRV Toolbox − I d e n t i t y ” )
14 va l sc = new SparkContext ( conf )
15 va l s s c = new StreamingContext ( sc , Duration (10000) )
16
17 // Map Output to Input
18 va l dataStreamVec = f o r ( i <− 1 to numClients ) y i e l d s s c . t extF i l eSt ream ( ”csem/
s r c /main/ r e s o u r c e s / csv /”+i . t oS t r i ng+”/
19 ” )
20 f o r ( i <− 1 to numClients ) {
21 dataStreamVec ( i −1) . saveAsTextFi les ( ”csem/ s r c /main/ r e s o u r c e s / r e s u l t s /” + i .
t oS t r i ng + ”/ i d e n t i t y ” )
22 }
23
24 s s c . s t a r t ( )
25 s s c . awaitTermination ( )
26 }
27 }
Listing A.3: Implementation of the Identity algorithm.
A.2 Client-Side Services Source Code
1 ”””Fake MQTT Generator
2
3 This module emulates a s enso r that p ub l i s h e s data to a MQTT t o p i c with a g iven
4 sample ra t e .
5 ”””
6 // Method names are those r equ i r ed to be over r idden by Paho MQTT
7 import paho . mqtt . pub l i sh as pub l i sh
8 import s i g n a l
9 import sys
10 import time
11 from datet ime import datet ime
12 from numpy import random
13
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14
15 // SIGTERM Signa l Handler
16 c l a s s K i l l e r :
17 k i l l n o w = False
18 de f i n i t ( s e l f ) :
19 s i g n a l . s i g n a l ( s i g n a l .SIGTERM, s e l f . e x i t g r a c e f u l l y )
20
21 de f e x i t g r a c e f u l l y ( s e l f , signum , frame ) :
22 s e l f . k i l l n o w = True
23
24
25 // Cal lback to be executed at s e r v i c e s t a r t up time
26 de f run ( sample rate ) :
27 i f sample rate == 0 :
28 r a i s e ZeroDiv i s i onError ( ”Can not s e t a 0 sample ra t e ” )
29 loop ( i n t ( sample rate ) )
30
31
32 de f loop ( sample rate ) :
33 ””” Endless Sample Generation
34
35 This module i s the e n d l e s s loop that gene ra t e s <sample rate>
36 new samples per second and p u b l i s h e s them to a MQTT t o p i c .
37
38 Parameters
39 −−−−−−−−−−
40 sample rate : f l o a t
41 How many samples are generated per second
42 ”””
43 k i l l e r = K i l l e r ( )
44 g l o b a l CL ID
45 p a s t t s = time . time ( )
46 whi le 1 :
47 value = ””
48 # F i r s t we generate <sample rate> timestamps in one second
49 tstamps = [ i f o r i in random . uniform ( low=time . time ( ) ,
50 high=time . time ( ) + 1 ,
51 s i z e =( sample rate ) ) ]
52 tstamps . s o r t ( )
53 # Second we compute the i n t e r v a l s between them
54 f o r i in tstamps :
55 tmp = datet ime . fromtimestamp ( i ) . s t r f t i m e ( ’%Y−%m−%d %H:%M:%S ’ )
56 value += tmp+’ , ’+s t r ( i n t ( ( i − p a s t t s ) ∗ 1e6 ) )+’ \n ’
57 p a s t t s = i
58 pub l i sh . s i n g l e ( ” a r t i f i c i a l −data−{}” . format (CL ID) , va lue )
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59 time . s l e e p (1 )
60 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
61 pr in t ( ” Ex i t t i ng g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
62 break
63
64
65 i f name == ” main ” :
66 ””” Standalone entry po int ”””
67 i f l en ( sys . argv ) < 2 :
68 r a i s e TypeError ( ”No Sample Rate provided ” )
69 CL ID = sys . argv [ 2 ]
70 run ( sys . argv [ 1 ] )
Listing A.4: Implementation of the sensor service.
1 ”””MQTT Subsc r ibe r and CSV Generator
2
3 This module s u b s c r i b e s to the data t o p i c in a MQTT queue and , whenever i t
4 s t a ck s a g iven amount o f samples i t g ene ra t e s a new csv f i l e .
5
6 Att r ibut e s
7 −−−−−−−−−−
8 count : i n t
9 Global counter .
10 c u r r s t r : s t r
11 Global s t r i n g accumulator .
12 ”””
13 import paho . mqtt . c l i e n t as mqtt
14 from datet ime import datet ime
15 import time
16 import s i g n a l
17 import sys
18 import os
19
20
21 count = 0
22 c u r r s t r = ””
23
24
25 c l a s s K i l l e r :
26 k i l l n o w = False
27 de f i n i t ( s e l f ) :
28 s i g n a l . s i g n a l ( s i g n a l .SIGTERM, s e l f . e x i t g r a c e f u l l y )
29
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30 de f e x i t g r a c e f u l l y ( s e l f , signum , frame ) :
31 s e l f . k i l l n o w = True
32
33
34 de f on message (mosq , obj , msg) :
35 ””” Cal lback method f o r the mosquitto c l i e n t .
36
37 Whenever the MQTT c l i e n t r e c e i v e s a new sample i t t r i g g e r s t h i s method .
38 When the cur rent count reaches the thresho ld , a new csv f i l e i s generated
39 and s to r ed in the l o c a l data d i r e c t o r y .
40
41 Parameters
42 −−−−−−−−−−
43 Parameters are those o f the standard implementation o f the MQTT c l i e n t
44 f o r Python .
45 ”””
46 g l o b a l count
47 g l o b a l c u r r s t r
48 g l o b a l FILE LINES
49 g l o b a l CL ID
50 g l o b a l LOCAL DATA DIR
51 g l o b a l k i l l e r
52 pr in t ( ” Received message” )
53 dcd msg = msg . payload . decode ( ” utf−8” ) . s p l i t ( ”\n” )
54 whole msg = [ i . s p l i t ( ” , ” ) f o r i in dcd msg i f i != ”” ]
55 f o r tmp in whole msg :
56 d = datet ime . s t rpt ime (tmp [ 0 ] , ’%Y−%m−%d %H:%M:%S ’ )
57 time stamp = time . mktime (d . t imetup le ( ) )
58 r r = tmp [ 1 ]
59 i f count == FILE LINES :
60 g l o b a l TS
61 pr in t ( ” I t took : {} s ” . format ( time . time ( ) − TS) )
62 c u r r s t r += ” {} ,{} ” . format ( time stamp , r r )
63 t s = i n t ( time . time ( ) ∗1 e3 )
64 f i l ename = ”{}{} ” . format (LOCAL DATA DIR, CL ID)+s t r ( t s )+” . csv ”
65 t ry :
66 with open ( f i l ename , ”w+” ) as f :
67 f . wr i t e ( c u r r s t r )
68 except FileNotFoundError as e :
69 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
70 mosq . d i s connec t ( )
71 pr in t ( ” Ex i t t i ng g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
72 break
73 count = 0
74 c u r r s t r = ””
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75 e l s e :
76 c u r r s t r += ” {} ,{}\n” . format ( time stamp , r r )
77 count += 1
78 e l s e :
79 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
80 mosq . d i s connec t ( )
81 pr in t ( ” Ex i t t i ng g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
82
83
84 de f s ta r t mqt t ( ) :
85 ””” Star t the MQTT c l i e n t ”””
86 g l o b a l CL ID
87 mqttc = mqtt . C l i en t ( )
88 mqttc . on message = on message
89 mqttc . connect ( ” l o c a l h o s t ” , port =1883)
90 mqttc . s ub s c r i b e ( ” a r t i f i c i a l −data−{}” . format (CL ID) )
91 mqttc . l o o p f o r e v e r ( )
92
93
94 i f name == ” main ” :
95 ””” Standalone execut ion entry po int ”””
96 t ry :
97 FILE LINES = i n t ( sys . argv [ 1 ] )
98 except IndexError as e :
99 pr in t ( ”Have not provided a FILE LINES value ! ” )
100 sys . e x i t (1 )
101 k i l l e r = K i l l e r ( )
102 CL ID = sys . argv [ 2 ]
103 LOCAL DATA DIR = sys . argv [ 3 ]
104 s ta r t mqt t ( )
105 TS = time . time ( )
Listing A.5: Implementation of the mqtt-subscriber service.
1 ”””CSV Producer
2
3 This module monitors a l o c a l data d i r e c t o r y and p e r o d i c a l l y sends the newly
4 added csv f i l e s to a remote d i r e c t o r y in order to be proces sed .
5
6 Att r ibut e s
7 −−−−−−−−−−
8 ”””
9 import os
10 import time
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11 import s i g n a l
12 import sys
13 from paramiko import SSHClient , SSHConfig , ProxyCommand , SFTPClient
14 from paramiko . u t i l import l o g t o f i l e
15 from s e r v e r c o n n e c t import s e r v e r c o n n e c t
16
17
18 c l a s s K i l l e r :
19 k i l l n o w = False
20 de f i n i t ( s e l f ) :
21 s i g n a l . s i g n a l ( s i g n a l .SIGTERM, s e l f . e x i t g r a c e f u l l y )
22
23 de f e x i t g r a c e f u l l y ( s e l f , signum , frame ) :
24 s e l f . k i l l n o w = True
25
26
27 de f monitor ( ssh , s f tp , ∗ args ) :
28 ””” Sending daemon
29
30 This method s t a r t s an i n f i n i t e loop that every <SEND PERIOD> l o ok s f o r
31 newly added data f i l e s and c o p i e s them to a remote d i r e c t o r y .
32
33 Parameters
34 −−−−−−−−−−
35 ssh : paramiko . SSHClient
36 SSH Cl i en t connected to the remote host .
37 s f t p : paramiko . SFTPClient
38 SFTP Cl i en t connected to the remote host .
39 ”””
40 g l o b a l LOCAL DATA DIR
41 path to watch = LOCAL DATA DIR
42 be f o r e = d i c t ( [ ( f , None ) f o r f in os . l i s t d i r ( path to watch ) ] )
43 g l o b a l SEND PERIOD
44 k i l l e r = K i l l e r ( )
45 whi le 1 :
46 time . s l e e p (SEND PERIOD)
47 a f t e r = d i c t ( [ ( f , None ) f o r f in os . l i s t d i r ( path to watch ) ] )
48 added = [ f f o r f in a f t e r i f f not in be f o r e ]
49 i f added :
50 f o r f in added :
51 l o c a l f i l e = LOCAL DATA DIR + s t r ( f )
52 g l o b a l REMOTE DATA DIR
53 r e m o t e f i l e = REMOTE DATA DIR + ”/” + s t r ( f )
54 s f t p . put ( l o c a l f i l e , r e m o t e f i l e )
55 os . remove ( l o c a l f i l e )
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56 # I f the re are a l o t o f f i l e s , not check ing i n s i d e a l s o l e ad s
57 # to e r r o r with code 137
58 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
59 pr in t ( ” Ex i t t i ng g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
60 break
61 be f o r e = a f t e r
62 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
63 pr in t ( ” Ex i t t i ng g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
64 break
65 f o r d in os . l i s t d i r (LOCAL DATA DIR) :
66 t m p f i l e = LOCAL DATA DIR + s t r (d)
67 os . remove ( t m p f i l e )
68
69
70 i f name == ” main ” :
71 ””” Standalone entry po int
72
73 The s c r i p t s i s executed as a subproces s and as a consequence in standa lone
74 mode . This i s done to prevent i t from block ing the r e s t o f the execut ion
75 and to prevent from working with Python ’ s thread ing l i b r a r y .
76 ”””
77 ssh , s f t p = s e r v e r c o n n e c t ( )
78 LOCAL DATA DIR = sys . argv [ 1 ]
79 REMOTE DATA DIR = sys . argv [ 2 ]
80 SEND PERIOD = i n t ( sys . argv [ 3 ] )
81 s f t p . mkdir (REMOTE DATA DIR)
82 monitor ( ssh , s f t p )
Listing A.6: Implementation of the producer service.
1 ””” Result Consumer Daemon
2
3 This module p e r i o d i c a l l y f e t c h e s data from a remote d i r e c t o r y conta in ing the
4 r e s u l t s o f the computation and c o p i e s them over SFTP to a l o c a l d i r e c t o r y .
5
6 Att r ibut e s
7 −−−−−−−−−−
8 FETCH PERIOD : i n t
9 How o f t en does the module f e t c h the newly generated d i r e c t o r i e s .
10 ”””
11 import os
12 import ge tpas s
13 import sys
14 import time
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15 import s i g n a l
16 from paramiko import SSHClient , SSHConfig , ProxyCommand , SFTPClient
17 from paramiko . u t i l import l o g t o f i l e
18 from s e r v e r c o n n e c t import s e r v e r c o n n e c t
19
20
21 c l a s s K i l l e r :
22 k i l l n o w = False
23 de f i n i t ( s e l f ) :
24 s i g n a l . s i g n a l ( s i g n a l .SIGTERM, s e l f . e x i t g r a c e f u l l y )
25
26 de f e x i t g r a c e f u l l y ( s e l f , signum , frame ) :
27 s e l f . k i l l n o w = True
28
29
30 de f g e t a l l ( s f tp , remote d ir , l o c a l d i r ) :
31 ”””Copy a whole d i r e c t o r y
32
33 The aim o f t h i s module i s to emulate the −r opt ion in scp . Note that t h i s
34 i s not r e c u r s i v e and only works in a f o l d e r with a known and given
35 s t r u c t u r e .
36
37 Parameters
38 −−−−−−−−−−
39 s f t p : paramiko . SFTPClient
40 SFTP Cl i en t connected to the remote host .
41 r emote d i r : s t r
42 Path o f the d i r e c t o r y we are copying from .
43 l o c a l d i r : s t r
44 Path o f the d i r e c t o r y we are copying to .
45 ”””
46 f o r f in s f t p . l i s t d i r ( r emote d i r ) :
47 r e m o t e f i l e = remote d i r + s t r ( f )
48 i f ( not f . s t a r t s w i t h ( ’ . ’ ) ) and ( not f . s t a r t s w i t h ( ’ ’ ) ) :
49 l o c a l f i l e = l o c a l d i r + s t r ( f )
50 s f t p . get ( r e m o t e f i l e , l o c a l f i l e )
51
52
53 de f monitor ( ssh , s f t p ) :
54 ””” Fetching daemon
55
56 This method s t a r t s an i n f i n i t e loop that every <FETCH PERIOD> l o ok s f o r
57 newly added d i r e c t o r i e s and c o p i e s them to a l o c a l r e s u l t d i r e c t o r y .
58
59 Parameters
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60 −−−−−−−−−−
61 ssh : paramiko . SSHClient
62 SSH Cl i en t connected to the remote host .
63 s f t p : paramiko . SFTPClient
64 SFTP Cl i en t connected to the remote host .
65 ”””
66 g l o b a l REMOTE RESULT DIR
67 g l o b a l FETCH PERIOD
68 g l o b a l LOCAL RESULT DIR
69 #pr in t (”CONSUMER: user −> {}” . format ( ge tpas s . g e tu s e r ( ) ) )
70 path to watch = REMOTE RESULT DIR
71 be f o r e = d i c t ( [ ( f , None ) f o r f in s f t p . l i s t d i r ( path to watch ) ] )
72 k i l l e r = K i l l e r ( )
73 whi le 1 :
74 time . s l e e p (FETCH PERIOD)
75 a f t e r = d i c t ( [ ( f , None ) f o r f in s f t p . l i s t d i r ( path to watch ) ] )
76 added = [ f f o r f in a f t e r i f f not in be f o r e ]
77 i f added :
78 f o r f in added :
79 l o c a l d i r = LOCAL RESULT DIR + s t r ( f ) + ”/”
80 r emote d i r = REMOTE RESULT DIR + ”/” + s t r ( f ) + ”/”
81 t ry :
82 os . mkdir ( l o c a l d i r )
83 g e t a l l ( s f tp , remote d ir , l o c a l d i r )
84 except F i l e E x i s t s E r r o r as e :
85 pr in t ( ” Fetching a f i l e that a l r eady e x i s t s ! ” )
86 be f o r e = a f t e r
87 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
88 pr in t ( ” Ex i t t i ng g r a c e f u l l y ! ” )
89 break
90 f o r d in os . l i s t d i r (LOCAL RESULT DIR) :
91 tmp dir = LOCAL RESULT DIR + d
92 f o r f in os . l i s t d i r ( tmp dir ) :
93 t m p f i l e = tmp dir + ”/” + f
94 os . remove ( t m p f i l e )
95 os . rmdir ( tmp dir )
96
97
98 i f name == ” main ” :
99 ””” Standalone entry po int
100
101 The s c r i p t s i s executed as a subproces s and as a consequence in standa lone
102 mode . This i s done to prevent i t from block ing the r e s t o f the execut ion
103 and to prevent myse l f from working with Python ’ s thread ing l i b r a r y .
104 ”””
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105 ssh , s f t p = s e r v e r c o n n e c t ( )
106 LOCAL RESULT DIR = sys . argv [ 1 ]
107 REMOTE RESULT DIR = sys . argv [ 2 ]
108 s f t p . mkdir (REMOTE RESULT DIR)
109 FETCH PERIOD = i n t ( sys . argv [ 3 ] )
110 monitor ( ssh , s f t p )
Listing A.7: Implementation of the consumer service.
A.3 Deployment Scripts
1 #! / usr / bin /python3
2 ”””Remote Side Standalone Launcher
3
4 This module implements the remote−s ide , standalone , launcher .
5 ”””
6 import os
7 import sys
8 import time
9 import s i g n a l
10 from s e r v e r c o n n e c t import s e r v e r c o n n e c t
11
12
13 c l a s s K i l l e r :
14 k i l l n o w = False
15 de f i n i t ( s e l f ) :
16 s i g n a l . s i g n a l ( s i g n a l .SIGTERM, s e l f . e x i t g r a c e f u l l y )
17
18 de f e x i t g r a c e f u l l y ( s e l f , signum , frame ) :
19 s e l f . k i l l n o w = True
20
21
22 de f main ( ssh , s f t p ) :
23 ”””Main execut ion method
24
25 This method conta in s the main deployment o f UC1. I t b a s i c a l l y s t a r t s each
26 and every process , launches the benchmarking , and c l e a n s everyth ing when
27 execut ion has f i n i s h e d .
28
29 Notes
30 −−−−−
31 Al l the s l e e p s are p laced due to exper i enced e r r o r s race c o n d i t i o n s . As a
32 consequence t h e i r arguments are complete ly e m p i r i c a l .
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33
34 Arguments
35 −−−−−−−−−
36 ssh : paramiko . SSHClient
37 SSH Cl i en t to the remote s e r v e r .
38 s f t p : paramiko . SFTPClient
39 SFTP Cl i en t to the remote s e r v e r .
40 ”””
41 g l o b a l ALGORITHM
42 g l o b a l SGX MODE
43 g l o b a l NUM CLIENTS
44 algo name = ” . / launch−csem−{}. sh {}” . format (ALGORITHM, NUM CLIENTS)
45 i f SGX MODE:
46 s c r i p t l i s t = [ ” . / master . sh” , ” . / worker . sh” , ” . / worker−enc lave . sh” ,
47 ” . / dr ive r−enc lave . sh” , algo name ]
48 e l s e :
49 s c r i p t l i s t = [ ” . / master . sh” , ” . / worker . sh” , algo name ]
50 f o r s c r i p t in s c r i p t l i s t :
51 in , out , e r r = ssh . exec command ( ”cd sgx−spark ; {} &” . format ( s c r i p t ) )
52 time . s l e e p (3 )
53 tmp command = ” dsta t − l −−noco lo r −−noheaders 10 > cpu load . csv ”
54 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ”cd sgx−spark ; {} &” . format ( tmp command) )
55 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
56 k i l l e r = K i l l e r ( )
57 whi le 1 :
58 time . s l e e p (1 )
59 i f k i l l e r . k i l l n o w :
60 pr in t ( ” K i l l i n g Grace fu l l y ! ” )
61 break
62 f o r s c r i p t in s c r i p t l i s t :
63 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ” k i l l $ ( pgrep −f ’{} ’ ) ” . format ( s c r i p t ) )
64 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
65 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ” k i l l $ ( pgrep −f ’ java ’ ) ” )
66 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
67 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ” k i l l $ ( pgrep −f ’ d s ta t ’ ) ” )
68 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
69 , out , = ssh . exec command ( ”rm /dev/shm/∗” )
70 out . r e a d l i n e s ( )
71 re turn 0
72
73
74 i f name == ” main ” :
75 ””” Entry po int f o r s tanda lone execut i on s
76
77 This entry po int conta in s the command l i n e argument par s ing .
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78 ”””
79 ssh , s f t p = s e r v e r c o n n e c t ( ”/home/ user / l o g f i l e . l og ” )
80 ALGORITHM = sys . argv [ 1 ]
81 SGX MODE = i n t ( sys . argv [ 2 ] )
82 NUM CLIENTS = i n t ( sys . argv [ 3 ] )
83 main ( ssh , s f t p )
Listing A.8: Server-Side Deployment Script.
1 v e r s i on : ’3’
2
3 s e r v i c e s :
4 consumer :
5 build : . / s e r v i c e s /consumer/
6 container name : "sgx-csem-client-consumer-${CL_ID}"
7 image : consumer : l a t e s t
8 command: "${CONTAINER_RESULT_DIR} ${REMOTE_RESULT_DIR}/${CL_ID} ${
FETCH_PERIOD}"
9 user : "${myUID}:${myGID}"
10 volumes :
11 − "/home/docker/results/${CL_ID}:${CONTAINER_RESULT_DIR}"
12 # - "${LOCAL_RESULT_DIR}${CL_ID}:${CONTAINER_RESULT_DIR}"
13 producer :
14 build : . / s e r v i c e s / producer /
15 container name : "sgx-csem-client-producer-${CL_ID}"
16 image : producer : l a t e s t
17 command: "${CONTAINER_DATA_DIR} ${REMOTE_DATA_DIR}/${CL_ID} ${SEND_PERIOD}"
18 volumes :
19 − "/home/docker/data/${CL_ID}:${CONTAINER_DATA_DIR}"
20 #- "${LOCAL_DATA_DIR}${CL_ID}:${CONTAINER_DATA_DIR}"
21 mqtt−sub :
22 build : . / s e r v i c e s / mqtt sub/
23 container name : "sgx-csem-client-mqtt-sub-${CL_ID}"
24 image : mqtt−sub : l a t e s t
25 network mode : "sgx-csem-net"
26 user : "${myUID}:${myGID}"
27 depends on :
28 − "mqtt"
29 volumes :
30 − "/home/docker/data/${CL_ID}:${CONTAINER_DATA_DIR}"
31 #- "${LOCAL_DATA_DIR}${CL_ID}:${CONTAINER_DATA_DIR}"
32 command: "${FILE_LINES} ${CL_ID} ${CONTAINER_DATA_DIR}"
33 fake−s enso r :
34 build : . / s e r v i c e s / fake−s enso r /
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35 container name : "sgx-csem-client-fake-sensor-${CL_ID}"
36 image : fake−s enso r : l a t e s t
37 network mode : "sgx-csem-net"
38 command: "${SAMPLE_RATE} ${CL_ID}"
39 depends on :
40 − "mqtt"
41 mqtt :
42 image : e c l i p s e−mosquitto
43 container name : "sgx-csem-mqtt-${CL_ID}"
44 network mode : "sgx-csem-net"
45 l o gg ing :
46 d r i v e r : none
Listing A.9: Client Docker Compose Script.
1 #! / usr / bin /python3
2 ””” Benchmarking and Evaluat ion launcher .
3
4 This module i n c l u d e s a l l the d i f e r e n t benchmarking s c e n a r i o n s cons ide r ed in the
5 p r o j e c t . I t a l s o deploys a l l o f them in a s e q u e n t i a l f a s h i o n .
6 ”””
7 import i t e r t o o l s
8 import sys
9 import os
10 import time
11 import subproces s
12 from datet ime import datet ime
13 import r e q u e s t s
14 import g lob
15 import s h u t i l
16 from s e r v e r c o n n e c t import s e r v e r c o n n e c t
17
18
19 de f que ry ba t ch proc e s s i ng ( f i l e d i r ) :
20 ”””Query Spark ’ s REST API
21 This method q u e r i e s sparks API f o r the batch p r o c e s s i n g time . I t f i r s t s
22 l aunches a port forwarding daemon in order to be ab le to perform the
23 r eque s t and then q u e r i e s the in fo rmat ion . Note that t h i s i s done only
24 once at the end o f the execut ion ( r i g h t be f o r e k i l l i n g i t ) .
25 ”””
26 proc = subproces s . Popen ( ”python3 port fo rward . py” . s p l i t ( ” ” ) )
27 time . s l e e p (2 )
28 app id = r e q u e s t s . get ( ’ http :// l o c a l h o s t :4040/ api /v1/ a p p l i c a t i o n s / ’ ) . j s on ( )
29 app id = app id [ 0 ] [ ’ id ’ ]
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30 req = ’ http :// l o c a l h o s t :4040/ api /v1/ a p p l i c a t i o n s /{}/ jobs / ’ . format ( app id )
31 r = r e q u e s t s . get ( req ) . j son ( )
32 t ime format = ”%Y−%m−%dT%H:%M:%S.% f ”
33 t imes = [ datet ime . s t rpt ime ( r [ i ] [ ’ completionTime ’ ] [ : − 3 ] ,
34 t ime format ) . timestamp ( ) −
35 datet ime . s t rpt ime ( r [ i ] [ ’ submissionTime ’ ] [ : − 3 ] ,
36 t ime format ) . timestamp ( )
37 f o r i in r eve r s ed ( range ( l en ( r ) ) ) i f ’ completionTime ’ in r [ i ] ]
38 proc . k i l l ( )
39 f i l ename = f i l e d i r + ” b a t c h p r o c e s s i n g t i m e s . csv ”
40 with open ( f i l ename , ”w+” ) as f :
41 f o r num, va l in enumerate ( t imes ) :
42 i f num == 0 :
43 f . wr i t e ( ”{} {}” . format (num, va l ) )
44 e l s e :
45 f . wr i t e ( ”\n{} {}” . format (num, va l ) )
46 re turn 0
47
48
49 de f query energy ( f i l e d i r , e l aps ed t ime = 0 , e n e r g y i n i = 0) :
50 ””” Query UniNe ’ s Powe Control System
51
52 The idea i s to compute consumed energy vs runtime so t h i s are the va lue s
53 that we w i l l pack . For f u r t h e r r e f e r e n c e below are the va lue s to query
54 f o r other th ing s .
55 pdu val | v a r i a b l e measured
56 1 | Voltage AC rms (V)
57 2 | Current AC rms (A)
58 8 | Total energy a c t i v e (kWh)
59 10 | Rese t tab l e energy ( ? ) a c t i v e (kWh)
60 DISCLAIMER: The cur rent r e s u l t i s in kWh!
61 ”””
62 port fw = ”python3 port fo rward . py”
63 port fw += ” −lp 8080 −ru powercontro l . maas −rp 80 −rh hoe rn l i −2”
64 proc = subproces s . Popen ( ”{}” . format ( port fw ) . s p l i t ( ” ” ) )
65 time . s l e e p (2 )
66 req = ’ http :// l o c a l h o s t :8080/ s t a t u s j s n . j s ? components=16384 ’
67 # In t h i s case we choose va lue 8 −> Energy
68 r = r e q u e s t s . get ( req ) . j son ( ) [ ’ s e n s o r v a l u e s ’ ] [ 1 ] [ ’ va lue s ’ ] [ 3 ] [ 8 ] [ ’ v ’ ]
69 # Obtain teh s h i t
70 # subproces s . c a l l (” k i l l $ ( pgrep −f ’{} ’ ) ” . format ( port fw ) , s h e l l=True )
71 proc . k i l l ( )
72 i f e n e r g y i n i :
73 f i l ename = f i l e d i r + ” energy consumption . csv ”
74 with open ( f i l ename , ”w+” ) as f :
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75 f . wr i t e ( ”{} {}\n” . format ( e lapsed t ime , f l o a t ( r ) − e n e r g y i n i ) )
76 e l s e :
77 re turn f l o a t ( r )
78
79
80 de f query memory ( f i l e d i r ) :
81 ssh , s f t p = s e r v e r c o n n e c t ( ” . / l o g f i l e . l og ” )
82 l o c a l f i l e = f i l e d i r + ” cpu load . csv ”
83 r e m o t e f i l e = ”/home/ubuntu/sgx−spark / cpu load . csv ”
84 s f t p . get ( r e m o t e f i l e , l o c a l f i l e )
85 s f t p . remove ( r e m o t e f i l e )
86 ssh . c l o s e ( )
87 s f t p . c l o s e ( )
88
89
90 # TODO: This w i l l ev en tua l l y have to change when we c o n t a i n e r i z e the c l i e n t
91 de f q u e r y a c t i v e c l i e n t s ( f i l e d i r , t o t a l c l i e n t s ) :
92 ssh , s f t p = s e r v e r c o n n e c t ( ” . / l o g f i l e . l og ” )
93 f i l ename = f i l e d i r + ” c l i e n t s . csv ”
94 r emote d i r = ”/home/ubuntu/sgx−spark /csem/ s r c /main/ r e s o u r c e s / csv /”
95 a c t i v e c l i e n t s = len ( s e t ( [ l . s p l i t ( ’ ’ ) [ 0 ] f o r l in s f t p . l i s t d i r ( r emote d i r ) ] ) )
96 with open ( f i l ename , ”w+” ) as f :
97 f . wr i t e ( ” Act ive c l i e n t s :\ t {}\n” . format ( a c t i v e c l i e n t s ) )
98 f . wr i t e ( ” Total c l i e n t s :\ t {}\n” . format ( t o t a l c l i e n t s ) )
99 ssh . c l o s e ( )
100 s f t p . c l o s e ( )
101
102
103 de f main ( ) :
104 ””” Launcher .
105
106 This method d e f i n e s a l l the d i f e r e n t benchmarking environments , the
107 parameters they take and deploys each and every execut ion .
108 ”””
109 # General v a r i a b l e s
110 #n v e r s i o n s = 1
111 #sr = [ 1 ]
112 #batch number = 200
113 #batch durat ion = 10
114
115 # Evaluat ion Var iab l e s
116 # Test :
117 #n c l i e n t s = [ 1 0 0 ]
118 #algor i thms = [ ” sdnn ” ]
119 #mode = [ 1 ]
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120 # Cl i en t S c a l a b i l i t y :
121 #n c l i e n t s = [ 1 , 50 , 250 , 500 ]
122 #algor i thms = [ ” sdnn ” , ” i d e n t i t y ” , ”hrvbands ” ]
123 #mode = [ 1 , 0 ]
124 # Maximal Throughput Many F i l e s
125 n v e r s i o n s = 1
126 s r = [100 , 200 , 300 , 400 , 500 ]
127 batch number = 20
128 batch durat ion = 10
129 n c l i e n t s = [ 1 ]
130 a lgor i thms = [ ”sdnn” ]
131 mode = [ 0 ]
132
133 f o r elem in i t e r t o o l s . product ( ∗ [ a lgor i thms , mode , s r ] ) :
134 f o r v e r s i o n in range ( n v e r s i o n s ) :
135 f o r c l i e n t in n c l i e n t s :
136 pr in t ( ” S ta r t i ng execut ion with the f o l l o w i n g parameters : ” )
137 pr in t ( ”\ t − Repl i ca : {} o f {}” . format ( v e r s i o n + 1 , n v e r s i o n s ) )
138 pr in t ( ”\ t − Number o f c l i e n t s : {}” . format ( c l i e n t ) )
139 pr in t ( ”\ t − Algorithm : {}” . format ( elem [ 0 ] ) )
140 pr in t ( ”\ t − SGX Enabled : {}” . format ( elem [ 1 ] ) )
141 pr in t ( ”\ t − Sample Rate : {}” . format ( elem [ 2 ] ) )
142 # The dynamic f i l e s i z e i s s e t so that one f i l e i s generated
143 # roughly every 10 seconds , so s imply sample rate ∗ 10 l i n e s .
144 f l = elem [ 2 ] ∗ 10
145 subproces s . c a l l ( ” . / deploy−s i n g l e−eva lua t i on . sh {} {} {} {} {}” .
format (
146 elem [ 0 ] , elem [ 1 ] , elem [ 2 ] , c l i e n t , f l ) . s p l i t ( ” ” ) )
147 tmp = ”/{} n c l i {} s g x {} s r {} v {}/” . format ( elem [ 0 ] , c l i e n t ,
148 elem [ 1 ] , elem [ 2 ] ,
149 ve r s i on )
150 f i l e d i r = OUTPUT DIR + tmp
151 os . makedirs ( f i l e d i r , e x i s t o k=True )
152 t ry :
153 e n e r g y i n i = query energy ( f i l e d i r )
154 e l apsed t ime = batch number∗ batch durat ion
155 time . s l e e p ( e l apsed t ime )
156 que ry ba t ch proc e s s i ng ( f i l e d i r )
157 query energy ( f i l e d i r , e lapsed t ime , e n e r g y i n i )
158 query memory ( f i l e d i r )
159 q u e r y a c t i v e c l i e n t s ( f i l e d i r , c l i e n t )
160 except Exception as e :
161 pr in t ( ”An except ion occured during the data grepping ! ” )
162 pr in t ( e )
163 f i n a l l y :
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164 subproces s . c a l l ( ” . / k i l l −execut ion . sh” )
165
166
167 i f name == ” main ” :
168 OUTPUT DIR = sys . argv [ 1 ]
169 main ( )
Listing A.10: Benchmarking and Experiment Deployment Script.
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Evaluation Code Snippets
1 #! / usr / bin /python3
2 ”””SSH Tunnel Daemon
3
4 This module s t a r t s a daemon that e s t a b l i s h e s a SSH tunne l from the l o c a l box
5 to the remote one . This i s done to be ab le to query Spark ’ s UI . I t i s
6 e s s e n t i a l l y a l o c a l port forwarding .
7 ”””
8 import os
9 import sys
10 import argparse
11 import socke t
12 from paramiko import SSHClient , SSHConfig , ProxyCommand
13 from paramiko . u t i l import l o g t o f i l e
14 from forward import fo rward tunne l
15
16
17 de f run (∗∗ kwargs ) :
18 ”””Main method
19
20 S t a r t s a subproces s that SSH ’ s to the remote host and e s t a b l i s h e s the
21 tunne l / port forwarding . In short , you w i l l s e e at l o c a l h o s t : l o c a l p o r t
22 the contents found at remote ur l : remote port as seen by remote host .
23
24 Att r ibut e s
25 −−−−−−−−−−
26 l o c a l p o r t : i n t
27 Local port towards which the connect ion i s forwarded .
28 r emote ur l : s t r
29 Remote u r l you are a c c e s s i n g from the remote host .
30 remote port : i n t
31 Port you w i l l be a c c e s s i n g the remote u r l through .
32 remote host : s t r
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33 Host through which you are e s t a b l i s h i n g the tunne l . Note that t h i s
34 host should appear in your . ssh / c o n f i g and , due to p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s
35 o f the implementation , i t must in c lude a ProxyCommand to be used .
36 ”””
37 ssh = SSHClient ( )
38 s s h c o n f i g = SSHConfig ( )
39 ssh . l oad sy s t em hos t key s ( )
40 with open ( os . path . expanduser ( ” ˜/ . ssh / c o n f i g ” ) ) as f :
41 s s h c o n f i g . parse ( f )
42 t ry :
43 d e t a i l s = s s h c o n f i g . lookup ( kwargs [ ’ remote host ’ ] )
44 except Exception as e :
45 l o g g e r . e r r o r ( ”The remote host {} i s not l i s t e d in your . ssh / c o n f i g ” +
46 ” f i l e ! ” . format ( kwargs [ ’ remote host ’ ] ) )
47 l o g t o f i l e ( ” l o g f i l e . l og ” )
48 ssh . connect ( hostname=d e t a i l s [ ’ hostname ’ ] , username=d e t a i l s [ ’ use r ’ ] ,
49 sock=ProxyCommand( d e t a i l s [ ’ proxycommand ’ ] ) )
50 f o rward tunne l ( kwargs [ ’ l o c a l p o r t ’ ] , kwargs [ ’ r emote ur l ’ ] ,
51 kwargs [ ’ rem port ’ ] , s sh . g e t t r a n s p o r t ( ) )
52
53
54 i f name == ” main ” :
55 par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( )
56 par s e r . add argument ( ”−lp ” , ”−− l o c a l p o r t ” , he lp=” Local forwarded port ” ,
57 type=int , nargs=’ ? ’ , d e f a u l t =4040 , const =4040)
58 par s e r . add argument ( ”−ru” , ”−−r emote ur l ” , he lp=”End URL ( from remote ) ” ,
59 type=str , nargs=’ ? ’ , d e f a u l t=’ l o c a l h o s t ’ ,
60 const=’ l o c a l h o s t ’ )
61 par s e r . add argument ( ”−rp” , ”−−rem port ” , he lp=”Remote used port ” , type=int ,
62 nargs=’ ? ’ , d e f a u l t =4040 , const =4040)
63 par s e r . add argument ( ”−rh” , ”−−remote host ” , he lp=”Remote host ” , type=str ,
64 nargs=’ ? ’ , d e f a u l t=” e i g e r −9” , const=” e i g e r −9” )
65 args = par s e r . p a r s e a r g s ( )
66 run (∗∗ vars ( args ) )
Listing B.1: Python Script to Set Up a Port Forwarding Daemon.
1 #! / usr / bin /env python
2
3 # Copyright (C) 2003−2007 Robey Pointer <robeypointer@gmai l . com>
4 #
5 # This f i l e i s part o f paramiko .
6 #
7 # Paramiko i s f r e e so f tware ; you can r e d i s t r i b u t e i t and/ or modify i t under the
75
8 # terms o f the GNU Lesse r General Publ ic L i cense as pub l i shed by the Free
9 # Software Foundation ; e i t h e r v e r s i o n 2 .1 o f the License , or ( at your opt ion )
10 # any l a t e r v e r s i on .
11 #
12 # Paramiko i s d i s t r i b u t e d in the hope that i t w i l l be use fu l , but WITHOUT ANY
13 # WARRANTY; without even the impl i ed warranty o f MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR
14 # A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Lesse r General Publ ic L i cense f o r more
15 # d e t a i l s .
16 #
17 # You should have r e c e i v e d a copy o f the GNU Lesse r General Publ ic L i cense
18 # along with Paramiko ; i f not , wr i t e to the Free Software Foundation , Inc . ,
19 # 59 Temple Place , Su i t e 330 , Boston , MA 02111−1307 USA.
20
21 ”””
22 Sample s c r i p t showing how to do l o c a l port forwarding over paramiko .
23
24 This s c r i p t connects to the reques ted SSH s e r v e r and s e t s up l o c a l port
25 forward ing ( the openssh −L opt ion ) from a l o c a l port through a tunneled
26 connect ion to a d e s t i n a t i o n reachab l e from the SSH s e r v e r machine .
27 ”””
28
29 import os
30 import socke t
31 import s e l e c t
32
33 t ry :
34 import SocketServer
35 except ImportError :
36 import s o c k e t s e r v e r as SocketServer
37
38 import sys
39 from optparse import OptionParser
40
41 import paramiko
42
43
44 SSH PORT = 22
45 DEFAULT PORT = 4000
46
47
48 c l a s s ForwardServer ( SocketServer . ThreadingTCPServer ) :
49 daemon threads = True
50 a l l o w r e u s e a d d r e s s = True
51
52
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53 c l a s s Handler ( SocketServer . BaseRequestHandler ) :
54 de f handle ( s e l f ) :
55 t ry :
56 chan = s e l f . s s h t r a n s p o r t . open channel (
57 ” d i r e c t−t cp ip ” ,
58 ( s e l f . cha in host , s e l f . cha in por t ) ,
59 s e l f . r eque s t . getpeername ( ) ,
60 )
61 except Exception as e :
62 re turn
63 i f chan i s None :
64 re turn
65
66 whi le True :
67 r , w, x = s e l e c t . s e l e c t ( [ s e l f . request , chan ] , [ ] , [ ] )
68 i f s e l f . r eque s t in r :
69 data = s e l f . r eque s t . recv (1024)
70 i f l en ( data ) == 0 :
71 break
72 chan . send ( data )
73 i f chan in r :
74 data = chan . recv (1024)
75 i f l en ( data ) == 0 :
76 break
77 s e l f . r eque s t . send ( data )
78
79 peername = s e l f . r eque s t . getpeername ( )
80 chan . c l o s e ( )
81 s e l f . r eque s t . c l o s e ( )
82
83
84 de f fo rward tunne l ( l o c a l p o r t , remote host , remote port , t r an spo r t ) :
85 # t h i s i s a l i t t l e convoluted , but l e t s me c o n f i g u r e th ing s f o r the Handler
86 # obj e c t . ( SocketServer doesn ’ t g ive Handlers any way to a c c e s s the outer
87 # s e r v e r normally . )
88 c l a s s SubHander ( Handler ) :
89 cha in hos t = remote host
90 cha in por t = remote port
91 s s h t r a n s p o r t = t ranspor t
92
93 ForwardServer ( ( ”” , l o c a l p o r t ) , SubHander ) . s e r v e f o r e v e r ( )
Listing B.2: Python Script to Set Up a SSH Tunnel.
